

Total Mobilization of Ukraine on Hybrid Warfare Strategy Against The Russian Invasion

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Abstract— The conflict between Ukraine and Russia has presented complex challenges in the form of hybrid warfare, where Ukraine has adopted a strategy of total mobilization to resist the Russian invasion. This thesis aims to analyze and evaluate how Ukraine implements total mobilization within the context of hybrid warfare strategy to counter the Russian invasion. Through a qualitative research approach using document analysis, interviews, and surveys, this research explores the mobilization policies, tactics, and comprehensive approaches employed by Ukraine. The literature review involves an in-depth examination of the concepts of total mobilization, hybrid warfare strategy, and the Ukraine-Russia conflict. The theoretical framework adopts mass mobilization theory and hybrid warfare theory to provide a better understanding of Ukraine's total mobilization practices in the face of the Russian invasion. The collected data include the analysis of Ukraine's policies and strategies, as well as interactions occurring through social media and other platforms during the conflict. Data analysis will involve assessing the effectiveness of Ukraine's total mobilization in mobilizing society, coordinating war efforts, and influencing the dynamics of the conflict. The results of this research are expected to provide better insights into the effectiveness of Ukraine's total mobilization strategy in confronting hybrid warfare with Russia. The implications of these findings can guide the Ukrainian government and international actors in supporting Ukraine's efforts to resist the Russian invasion and defend their sovereignty.

Keywords— Conflict, Communication, Hybrid warfare strategy, Ukraine-Russia War, Total Mobilization.

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, global security dynamics have witnessed a shift towards unconventional threats, prominently characterized by the rise of hybrid warfare. The concept of hybrid warfare involves the integration of conventional military tactics with irregular and non-military methods, such as cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion. This paradigm challenges

traditional notions of conflict, necessitating innovative strategies from nations facing such multifaceted challenges. The hybrid warfare strategy itself is currently widely debated both in Western academic and military circles, especially since Russia's success in annexing Crimea in 2014 in the Ukraine conflict. Through the hybrid warfare strategy, Russia can project its interests to expand its influence in the region, especially the former Soviet countries. Hybrid warfare poses a unique set of challenges to nations, as it transcends conventional military boundaries and exploits vulnerabilities in multiple domains. Understanding the effectiveness of responses to hybrid threats is critical for policymakers and military strategists globally. Ukraine's experience provides an intriguing case study, given its sustained conflict with Russia and the adoption of the Total Mobilization Strategy. However, there is a gap in the literature regarding the nuanced analysis of the outcomes and impacts of Ukraine's strategy.

Hybrid Warfare is a form of contemporary or modern war strategy which in its implementation can be done by combining two types of strategies in war, namely between Conventional warfare and Unconventional warfare strategies (Najzer, 2020). The concept of hybrid warfare recognizes that military power alone may not be sufficient to achieve strategic objectives in modern conflicts. States must also use non-military means, such as diplomacy, propaganda and cyber warfare, to weaken the enemy and achieve their goals. (Guerrero, 2022). Hybrid warfare is a strategy applied by Russia in annexing Crimea in the 2014 Ukraine conflict. In its application, the successful use of this strategy is a blow to the West about the challenges of using unconventional forces as weapons in carrying out war. The strategic environment in the contemporary era indeed forces actors to apply tactics that are considered the most effective in achieving their interests. (Hoffman, 2009). Hybrid warfare can also involve offensive cyberspace activities; and psychological operations that use social and traditional media to influence international perceptions and opinions (The Military Balance 2015).

This study focuses on the Ukrainian response to Russia's hybrid warfare, specifically examining the effectiveness of Ukraine's Total Mobilization Strategy. Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine has been at the forefront of countering Russia's hybrid tactics, requiring a comprehensive and adaptive approach. The Total Mobilization Strategy, encompassing military, economic, technological, and societal dimensions, represents Ukraine's effort to address the complexity of hybrid warfare. The Total Mobilization Strategy adopted by Ukraine is a comprehensive approach that recognizes the need to address all aspects of national power in order to effectively counter a Russian invasion and defend its sovereignty.

Ukraine's Total Mobilization Strategy includes leveraging its technological capabilities to improve its defense and security. This includes the development and deployment of advanced weaponry, cybersecurity measures to protect against cyberattacks, and the use of surveillance technology to monitor Russian activities. Next, the Total Mobilization Strategy involves strong political leadership and diplomatic efforts to garner international support and condemnation of Russian aggression. This entails diplomatic efforts to mobilize regional and international alliances, as well as advocating for sanctions against Russia and raising awareness of the ongoing conflict. Overall, Ukraine's Total Mobilization Strategy in response to the Russian invasion was a comprehensive approach that recognized the need for a coordinated and multi-faceted response.

Understanding the Hybrid Warfare Strategy implemented by Russia in Ukraine is crucial to understanding the rationale behind Ukraine's Total Mobilization Strategy. Russia's hybrid warfare strategy in Ukraine includes a variety of military and non-military means (Veebel, 2020). The immediate need for Ukraine is to win the war, or at least impede Russia's advance, but it is clear that Ukraine needs both military and civilian assistance. In addition, Ukraine needs massive help in economic recovery. Ukraine has suffered economic blows on several fronts, including the loss of industry in Crimea and its eastern regions, direct losses from the war, lost trade with Russia, and Russia's punitive measures ranging from import bans to economic sanctions against individuals. As a result, after 2014, trade between Russia and Ukraine fell by 75% and, according to Ukrainian economists, has fallen back to early 2000s levels. All of these problems have also shrunk Ukraine's economy, with GDP falling from \$183 billion in 2013 to \$91 billion in 2015, and to \$153 billion in 2019. In the first year since the massive invasion on February 24, 2022, the Ukrainian economy lost 30-35% of GDP.

The challenge relates to workers, following massive emigration from Ukraine. More than eight million Ukrainians were forced to flee to other countries in Europe after the Russian invasion. The biggest obstacle on the Ukrainian side is the availability of materials, such as combat vehicles, as losses mount. Spare parts and ammunition for many Soviet-era systems became scarce and their availability depended on the willingness of non-Western countries to sell their stocks. This study aims to fill this gap by investigating the effectiveness of Ukraine's Total Mobilization Strategy, offering insights into the interplay between military, economic, technological, and societal responses. By examining specific aspects such as mobilization efforts, economic initiatives, technological advancements, and societal responses, the research seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of countering

hybrid warfare. This study holds significance for several reasons. Firstly, it contributes to the academic discourse on hybrid warfare by providing an in-depth analysis of a real-world case. Understanding the effectiveness of Ukraine's Total Mobilization Strategy can offer valuable insights for scholars and researchers studying contemporary security challenges.

Secondly, the findings of this research can inform policymakers and military strategists facing similar hybrid threats. By identifying the strengths and weaknesses of Ukraine's approach, it provides practical lessons that can be adapted and applied in other geopolitical contexts. Lastly, this study is timely and relevant in the context of the evolving global security landscape. As hybrid warfare continues to be a prominent feature of modern conflicts, comprehensive studies on response strategies are crucial for building resilient and adaptive defense mechanisms. The scope of this study is delimited to the examination of Ukraine's Total Mobilization Strategy in response to Russia's hybrid warfare, focusing on the period from 2014 to the present. The geographical scope encompasses Ukraine, with particular attention to the conflict zones in Eastern Ukraine and the annexed Crimea.

However, it is essential to acknowledge the limitations of this research. Due to the dynamic nature of hybrid warfare, the findings may be subject to changes in geopolitical conditions. Additionally, constraints such as access to sensitive information and potential biases in source materials may impact the comprehensiveness of the analysis.

II. RESEARCH METHOD

The primary methodology employed in this investigation is a comprehensive literature review. Secondary data, gathered from an examination of 26 literature sources, forms the basis of information for understanding the multifaceted challenges posed by the Ukraine Total Mobilization on Hybrid Warfare Strategy to Fight Against the Russian Invasion. This approach aligns with Creswell's (2013) definition of qualitative research methods, emphasizing exploration and understanding through an in-depth exploration of meanings by individuals or groups connected to social or human issues.

STUDY SETTING

The research took place in Jakarta, Indonesia, spanning from September 2023 to January 2024. The choice of Jakarta as the setting was not arbitrary; rather, it was strategically selected due to its geopolitical significance. Scholars engaged in a discourse to provide a concise overview of the subjects of inquiry, which include the readiness of the Ukrainian state in organizing total mobilization, Ukraine's strategy in facing the Russian invasion, and the support extended by NATO countries in Ukraine's hybrid warfare strategy.

INFORMATION PROCESSING

After acquiring suitable references, the collected data underwent a meticulous organization based on its relevance to the research title, "Ukraine Total Mobilization on Hybrid Warfare Strategy to Fight Against the Russian Invasion." This initial step in processing information involved categorizing and structuring the literature to facilitate a systematic and coherent analysis.

INFORMATION ANALYSIS

The data obtained from literature sources was subjected to analysis using descriptive narratives. This analytical approach aligns with Creswell's (2013) methodology for qualitative research, involving the exploration, interpretation, and simultaneous reporting of results. The descriptive narratives aimed to provide a comprehensive understanding of various aspects, such as the readiness of Ukraine in total mobilization, the strategies employed against the Russian invasion, and the support received from NATO countries. This method ensured a nuanced exploration of the complexities associated with hybrid warfare, contributing to a deeper comprehension of the international security landscape.

The utilization of qualitative research methods and a literature review facilitated a holistic exploration of the chosen research topics. The subsequent sections delve into the specific subjects and objects of the research, the selected research subjects (informants), and the objectives of the investigation, providing a detailed account of the study's framework and design.

III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The investigation into the Ukraine Total Mobilization on Hybrid Warfare Strategy to Fight Against the Russian Invasion unfolds multifaceted aspects, exploring the readiness of Ukraine's mobilization, Ukraine's strategy for total mobilization, and the support extended by NATO countries.

Readiness of Ukraine's Mobilization Efforts

The readiness of Ukraine's mobilization efforts emerges as a complex interplay of factors involving strategic planning, resource allocation, and societal participation. The literature review indicates that Ukraine has made significant strides in organizing total mobilization, reflecting a proactive approach in the face of the Russian invasion. Informants, particularly key individuals such as the Director of Kerisn Ditjen Strahan Kemhan RI and the Director of Eropa II Ditjen Amerop Kemlu RI, shed light on Ukraine's meticulous planning and execution of mobilization strategies.

Ukraine's readiness to carry out Ukraine's total mobilization from the aspect of personnel is to start mobilizing civilians into the army after declaring martial law in February 2022 when Russia launched a massive invasion. mobilization is the only way to protect Ukraine and repel Russian occupation. According to him, mobilization is not only about the army but also covers all aspects. Ukraine's total mobilization depends on several factors including military strength, national defense policy, infrastructure, public support, and international relations.

The research findings show that Ukraine has significant readiness for total mobilization in response to the Russian threat. This readiness covers various aspects, including military strength, economic resources and public support. Militarily, Ukraine has improved the training of military personnel and upgraded military equipment and technology. Ukraine has a well-trained army with the capability to respond quickly to threats. In addition, defense strategies and mobilization plans are well developed to deal with conflict scenarios. Economic resources, especially in the defense industry sector, have been strengthened to support the production and maintenance of military equipment. Ukraine also cooperates with international partners, such as NATO countries, for support in the form of economic and technological assistance.

Community readiness is reflected in the willingness of citizens to participate in mobilization efforts. Training and simulation programs are conducted regularly to ensure that citizens know how to respond and contribute to emergency situations. With these measures, Ukraine has demonstrated strong readiness in organizing a total mobilization in response to the threat from Russia. On the other hand, Ukraine has International support, support from allies and international partners who can help Ukraine face pressure from the Russian side.”

Collaboration emerges from the experience of past civil resistance movements. Three successful popular revolutions in 1991, 2004, and 2014, as well as the fight against the recent Covid pandemic refined Ukraine's resilience and taught people to act without waiting for instructions. Volodymyr Zelenksyy's pre-war mission to digitize public services through the Diia app has enabled digital identity cards, driver's license renewals, destroyed property reports, and business registrations, all done on a single digital platform. Today, Ukraine's railway system remains a reliable carrier of cargo and passengers. The banking system is working well; and macroeconomic stability is maintained.

The private sector has also adapted to deal with adversity. Years of economic instability, caused in part by a trade war waged by Russia since 2003, taught Ukrainian companies to pursue new markets, innovate and adapt. In response to the current energy shortage, almost half of food retail chains now have generators and the number of alternative energy supplies is growing. At the same time, agricultural companies are looking for alternative ways to export grains via Baltic Sea ports or the Romanian port of Constanța.

Next Technological Mobilization, as Ukraine invests in technological advancements, including cybersecurity, to protect its infrastructure from potential cyberattacks that could be used by Russia in a hybrid war with this mobilization. Next Diplomatic Mobilization, where Ukraine actively engages in diplomatic efforts to mobilize regional and international alliances, seek support for sanctions against Russia, and raise awareness of the continuing threat to its sovereignty and lastly through Societal Mobilization, where Ukraine should focus on developing societal cohesion and resilience by encouraging national unity, inclusiveness, and common goals in the face of Russian aggression.

The research findings are in line with Greene's (2007) opinion that total war strategy refers to the use of overall resources; especially the military and society in an effort to win the war. In this case, total war belongs to a grand strategy. This concept refers to the use of engagement to achieve a total goal. In its application, this engagement combines all levels of warfare - strategic, operational, tactical, technical (Rakha Pratama, 2023). Junger (1930) further explained that in Jünger's vision of total mobilization, no energy can escape its codification and discipline; all forces must be harnessed to support the "war effort". The important thing to remember about total mobilization is the full integration of the individual in the war effort. It is not just the

subject's physical and technical capacities that must be harnessed for the Cause, but the Cause must penetrate to his or her "essence"; mobilization for the Cause is not what a person does, but who he or she is at the core of his or her identity.



Figure 1. Ukraine and Russia Map

Ukraine's Strategy for Total Mobilization

Ukraine is a small country that does not have enough power to fight a great power like Russia. Therefore, Ukraine uses strategy to fight Russia. According to John Lovell, strategy is a series of steps or decisions designed in advance in a competitive situation where the end result is not merely fortuitous (Mas'ood, 1994). The selection of a strategy is based on the consideration of profit and loss in achieving a clear goal. Strategy formulation uses calculated actions.

The research findings show that Ukraine's strategies include military and non-military strategies. Ukraine implements a number of military strategies against Russia, especially in the context of conflicts in regions such as Crimea and Donbas. Some combination of military strategies implemented by Ukraine, Ukraine seeks to protect its sovereignty and respond to threats from Russia in an effective and balanced way from the involvement of aspects. Hybrid Warfare and Asymmetric Warfare strategies are employed when Ukraine faces threats from Russia, consisting of a combination of conventional military force and non-military tactics such as propaganda, cyber warfare, and support for separatist groups. Also Ukraine relies on asymmetric warfare strategies to counter Russia's superior military power. This includes the utilization of guerrilla tactics, partisan resistance, and the use of regional geography for tactical advantage. Ukraine engages in International Cooperation, by which it seeks international support to strengthen its defense position. This involves cooperation with allied countries and diplomatic efforts to gain political and military support from the international community. The next military strategy is to modernize the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Zelenski seeks to continue modernizing his armed forces. This involves developing and acquiring advanced military equipment, training military personnel, and improving air and ground defense capabilities. The Deterrence strategy that Ukraine employs to prevent conflict escalation in addition to an immediate military response, which includes clear communication related to the consequences of military aggression and efforts to limit the potential for escalation (Aththariq Rizki, 2021).

Militarily, Ukraine has adopted a policy of setting up a Reserve Army. Ukrainian military commander Valerii Zaluzhnyi said one of his priorities is to build up the army's reserves, drawing up plans to prevent the war from becoming a stalemate. The plan focuses on improving Ukraine's air capabilities, electronic warfare, drones, anti-artillery and mine clearance. Furthermore, the Government sought to improve the conscription system by introducing a unified conscription list, and expanding the categories of citizens who could be called up for training or mobilization. The Ukrainian Government Reduces the Number of Aged Reserve Soldiers. The average age of Ukrainian soldiers on the front lines is over 40. Parliament drafted legislation to improve mobilization and demobilization procedures. The bill, will cover what to do with people who have been fighting for two years without rotation, how to demobilize soldiers returning after being prisoners of war, and also address "issues related to the age of conscripts".

The Ukrainian government is implementing a new hybrid transformation model, in particular, the adoption of new structures and clear priorities has created enabling conditions for Ukraine's resilience. These include the development of a more effective

command and control structure, the development of the NCO Corps and Special Forces Operators, and the pursuit of specific procurement goals. Other elements of the military reforms introduced prior to the invasion that are generally regarded as critical to Ukraine's success include a substantial increase in training, advice and intelligence support from NATO countries, which has played an important role in increasing the UAF's warfighting potential, as well as the development of Ukraine's reserve system and the creation of Territorial Defense battalions. Sanders (2023) states The Third Wave of Ukraine's Military Reform 2016-2022 shows Ukraine's military reforms since 2016, particularly the focus on Command and Control, the development of the NCO Corps and Special Forces and clear procurement priorities have created the enabling conditions for the development of a flexible and adaptable military force, capable of limiting Russia's battlefield success and taking the fight to the enemy.

Ukraine's non-military strategy is carried out through diplomatic policies. Ukraine uses diplomatic channels, especially approaches to major countries (G7, EU, NATO) and states that Russia has violated international law and must get international sanctions, including including the agenda that the Russian President is included as a criminal and as a human rights violator. In terms of opening export opportunities, Ukraine opened communication with neighboring countries related to the opening of logistics channels that have not been able to optimize the ports of Odesa, Chornomorski and Pivdenii in southern Ukraine.

Ukraine's Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, which is part of the European Association Agreement, was canceled by Ukraine's president, Viktor Yanukovich, and the European Union. On September 16, 2014 in Strasbourg, France. The agreement addresses political relations and free trade. Ukraine took an important decision to approach the EU, by means of political dialog and establishing ground rules for cooperation in areas such as energy, trade and education. This led Ukraine to implement reforms and respect the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

The research findings are in accordance with the opinion of Smith & Stone (2011) that in an effort to meet the effectiveness criteria in implementing a strategy, an actor needs to utilize all the resources they have which are then used as a means to achieve the goals of an actor's interests. However, in utilizing the resources that the actor has, the actor needs to align the situation they will face with the resources they have so that the implementation of the strategy they will carry out can be more efficient and have a higher level of effectiveness. Ukraine has utilized all resources through military and non-military strategies.

NATO Support

The Russia-Ukraine conflict certainly causes pros and cons between certain groups, international organizations and countries in the world to support one of these countries or not. One of the international organizations that support Ukraine against Russia is NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organizations), a collectivebased international organization engaged in defense and security that was founded in 1949 by the United States and several other western countries. The research findings show that sending aid to Ukraine by NATO countries is considered an investment move whose benefits outweigh the costs, this is because if NATO countries continue to send aid to Ukraine, this will put strong economic and diplomatic pressure on Russia to immediately end the war and this action taken by NATO countries is believed to maintain and increase the trust of NATO countries, because if NATO countries fail to provide assistance, this will make their allies lose confidence in security guarantees and deterrence by NATO countries (Cordesman, 2022).

The role of NATO States reflects NATO's commitment to maintaining stability and security in the region, as well as supporting partner countries facing security challenges. Among other commitments in the area of Political Support, NATO countries expressed their political support for Ukraine, recognizing its sovereignty and territorial integrity. NATO condemned Russian aggression and urged a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In the area of Non-Kinetic Security Assistance, NATO States provide security assistance to Ukraine in non-kinetic forms, including military training, defense capacity building, and intelligence exchange. This aims to strengthen Ukraine's ability to deal with security threat. In the area of Economic Assistance NATO and its members provide economic assistance to Ukraine to support post-conflict recovery and development. This assistance can include development aid, economic reforms and investment. In the area of Economic Sanctions Together several NATO countries jointly imposed economic sanctions on Russia in response to aggression in Ukraine. This creates economic pressure to respond to violations of international law. In the area of Diplomacy, NATO countries engage in diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts. This can include support to international mediation and participation in diplomatic forums to seek peaceful solutions. In the area of Deterrence and Military Readiness NATO enhances deterrence in the Eastern European region, including increased military presence and joint exercises. This aims to demonstrate commitment to collective security and provide a strong

signal against potential threats. In the area of Humanitarian Assistance NATO and its member states can provide humanitarian assistance to victims of the conflict in Ukraine, including medical assistance, logistics, and protection for affected civilians.

The assistance provided by NATO countries to Ukraine reflects the collective efforts of NATO countries involving various forms, including Military and Security Assistance which includes military training, provision of military equipment, and support in strengthening Ukraine's defense capacity. This assistance aims to improve Ukraine's ability to deal with security threats. Intelligence Support, where NATO countries can share intelligence and security information with Ukraine to assist in understanding and addressing threats. Economic assistance is provided to support post-conflict recovery and economic reform. This could include development assistance, loans, or other financial support.. Humanitarian Aid, provided to affected civilians. This includes medical assistance, food, protection and other humanitarian services. Diplomatic Support, both in the form of official statements and participation in diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict. Economic Sanctions Assistance, as a form of pressure against violations of international law, several NATO countries and the European Union imposed economic sanctions on Russia. Air Defense Assistance to strengthen Ukraine's air defenses, including air defense systems and protection against air attacks. Logistics and Transportation Assistance provided to support troop mobility and the distribution of humanitarian aid. Marsh (2023) explains that aid providers put more emphasis on equipment than training, a viable option as Ukraine already has a high level of combat skills and military organization.

The actions of NATO countries that decided to get involved in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine to defend Ukraine by sending military aid to Ukraine with a very fantastic amount are certainly based on the national interests of NATO countries themselves, as mentioned by Nuchterlin (1979) that there are 2 interests of NATO countries in providing their military assistance to Ukraine.

The first is Defense Interest or defense interests are the first concern of NATO countries in providing military assistance to Ukraine, this includes the protection of nation-states and citizens from threats of physical violence by other countries, protection against external influences, and threats to the national political system. As we know, Russia's invasion of Ukraine is nothing but to spread their influence in Ukraine (Sorongan, 2022). This is an external threat to Ukraine's national political system, but because of the rejection by the Ukrainian people, Russia then launched their invasion through military attacks, which is included in physical violence by other countries.

Defense Interest / National defense is highly prioritized by NATO countries considering that they often face international conditions that endanger their own countries such as terrorism, radical idealism, and so on (Rahsahad, 2011). Therefore, NATO countries are very aggressive in spreading and promoting the values/principles of freedom and democracy to voice war against violence and seek alliances, the idea of the United States to promote freedom and democratic values.

Economic Interest is the next concern for NATO Countries in providing military assistance to Ukraine, namely that NATO Countries benefit from trade relations carried out during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is known that the benefits obtained by NATO Countries are that they take advantage of the existing European market situation. There is currently a shortage of natural gas supplies but demand for natural gas is at an all-time high due to Russia as the main supplier of Europe's natural gas needs cutting off export-import relations with European countries (Sorongan, 2022).

IV. CONCLUSION

The readiness of the Ukrainian state to conduct total mobilization of its national strength in the face of the Russian invasion. Ukraine has prepared nearly 200,000 troops in active duty (organized into 29 maneuver brigades) and another 900,000 in reserve forces (organized into four heavy reserve brigades and 23 light reserve brigades). In terms of defense industry, Ukraine has played a crucial role by repairing military equipment. Ukraine has innovated and refined technology in three ways: creating user-friendly designs accessible at all levels, preparing satellite image applications and targeting information above traditional battlefield tracking positions, and utilizing social media directly to Delta to present a more holistic view of the battlefield. Additionally, Ukraine employs Kropyva, developed by a Ukrainian non-profit organization; this software runs on simple Android tablets and enables more effective artillery targeting by involving civilians directly as intelligence agents. Ukraine has leveraged existing government apps, with updated versions allowing Ukrainian forces to gather intelligence from ordinary citizens. Diia has been installed on 70% of smartphones in Ukraine. Ukraine has formed agile government-private partnerships to enhance flexibility and responsiveness to rapidly changing battlefield conditions. Ukraine harnesses the power of mobilized and technologically armed

civilian populations. Ukraine conducts training for both regular and reserve forces, integrating and aligning its energy and climate policies with EU policies.

Ukraine's Hybrid Warfare Strategy in Facing the Russian Invasion. Ukraine's strategy includes military and non-military strategies. Ukraine uses intervention with the deployment of conventional military force concurrently with increased intensity in information warfare and special operations forces (SOF) operations. Ukraine employs hybrid warfare principles to counter attacks from Russia, utilizing reserve forces and developing plans to prevent the conflict from reaching a deadlock. The plans focus on improving air capabilities, electronic warfare, drones, anti-artillery measures, and mine clearance. The government aims to address military conscription issues by introducing an integrated conscription list and expanding the categories of citizens available for training or mobilization. Ukraine reduces the number of aged reserve troops while enhancing public trust in the government. Ukraine utilizes the resilience of Ukrainian civil society as a key advantage in facing external threats, implementing a series of digital mediation practices to achieve conflict-related goals, including participation in content creation, distribution, and verification about the war. Intelligence gathering is also supported by drone owners' communities.

NATO Countries' Assistance Supporting Ukraine's Hybrid Warfare Strategy Against the Russian Invasion. NATO countries support allies by providing assistance, coordinating efforts, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian and military aid. Military aid includes lethal weapons such as anti-tank missiles, artillery weapons, air defense systems, armored combat vehicles, anti-structure ammunition, and three rocket launcher systems. Non-lethal military aid consists of unmanned aerial systems, body protection, helmets, night vision equipment, mine detection equipment, medical equipment, and winter clothing. Other military assistance includes army training, logistic support, and field hospital provision.

Thereby, the researchers would suggest that the use of hybrid warfare strategy by Russia is not a casual step, considering the evolving times that will likely lead to increased activities, both terrorist and future enemy engagements, in terms of resources and artillery. Consequently, the Ukrainian government needs to take precautionary measures by studying and leveraging unconventional methods used by the opponent. For NATO member states, there is a need for increased focus on investigating and highlighting Russian violations. Allied governments and the UN should take action to restore norms through diplomacy, economic pressure, and legal measures, considering the unprecedented danger faced by health facilities and personnel due to ongoing international law violations. The UN should take action to either remove Russia from the Security Council or suspend its veto power due to conflicting interests. The presence of Russia in the Security Council with veto power, while invading a sovereign country, contradicts the UN Charter. Civilized nations must oppose these violations and punish them now, or silently adapt to the global reality of Russia's attacks on civilians, its cruelty, and war crimes. It's time for "neutral" nations to stop buying cheap Russian oil, which funds and advances Russia's hegemonic ambitions, encouraging their atrocities against neighboring countries. Trade should be restricted to reduce funding for Russia's war and limit imports to sustain Russia's military power. Along with other sanctions on Russian banks, companies, and individuals, these measures should be applied until Russia withdraws from Ukraine. Anyone, anywhere, who does nothing risks further violations from law-breaking parties.

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