

# *Foreign Policy Implementation And Military Involvement: A Case Study Of Mozambique*

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**Abstract** – Africa is a region that has more conflict vulnerability three times higher than other regions in the world. The conflict in the African region mostly caused by the selection of state boundaries in Africa that do not see the logic of ethnicity and ethnic separation with various backgrounds can be encountered. This situation leads to making Africa known as the weakest and worst region of other regions due to the many unresolved conflicts. Mozambique is one of the countries prone to conflict, especially in the case of insurgency. A variety of factors made Mozambique a fertile ground for violent extremism is the province is home to the largest array of natural resources but least developed in the country. The origins of the insurgency have been attributed to uncondusive domestic policies leading to prolonged and unresolved conflict in the country. Domestic and international environments play a pivotal role in influencing policy-making for Mozambique. The intensification of insurgency activities, particularly in the Cabo Delgado Region of Mozambique at a scale beyond its national capability forced the nation to request and accept foreign military intervention.

**Keywords** – Mozambique, Cabo Delgado, Insurgency, Foreign Policy, Military Intervention.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Nowadays we are living in an era of relative peace compared to most of history that ever happened before. Unfortunately, this does not mean that there are no conflicts in the world today. Entering the era of globalization, conflicts that occur are now more common in countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. However, the number of conflicts that occur between these regions is more dominated by the African region which has a conflict vulnerability level 3 times higher than other regions (Adnan, 2008).

Africa is a continent inhabited by 54 sovereign states, 9 territories, and 2 territories of independent states with limited authority (Ikome, 2012). The high level of conflict vulnerability in the African region is caused by the selection of state boundaries in Africa that do not see the logic of ethnicity and ethnic separation, the *divide et impera* (divisive politics) that still occurs in African countries, differences in political opportunities, high vulnerability to foreign interference, poverty, corruption, and kleptocracy. Therefore, until now the African region is known as an area that has a fairly high intensity of the conflict. In most African countries, a number of conflicts with various backgrounds can be encountered, such as economic, social, political, and cultural conflicts.

According to Collier and Gunning (1999), the 1970s was a turning point in the successful development of post-independence Africa. The development of countries in Africa took place quite rapidly. In that era, the stability of the country was relatively well maintained, so many experts predict that the African region will have a bright future. However, in the mid-1970s development in African countries actually experienced a significant decline. These conditions encourage the emergence of new conflicts and generally continue in the long term.

However, not all conflicts in Africa started after the independence era. Some African countries such as South Africa, Rwanda, Angola, and Mozambique have been colored by conflict before these countries gained status as independent countries. At a certain time, conflicts that arise in African countries can be resolved easily, but usually will reoccur in the future. This condition causes the African region to seem inseparable from conflict all the time. Even Africa is often rated as the weakest and worst region than other regions due to the many unresolved conflicts.

Along with that, Mozambique is one of many African countries in which there are various conflicts. Mozambique is one of the poorest countries in the world, despite its rich potential resources and economic opportunities, even though Mozambique has large reserves of coal, natural gas as well as petroleum, as well as gold, and gems (Santegidio, 2017).

Like most other African countries, Mozambique is one of the countries prone to conflict, especially civil war conflicts. In Mozambique itself, there have been several civil wars. Even the civil war that took place in Mozambique is classified as one of the longest conflicts in Africa because it is difficult to reach a settlement point. In addition to taking a long time, the civilians in Mozambique also caused a fairly high number of casualties and material losses.

According to Rosario et al (2021), the problem in Mozambique has been decades in the making, stemming back at least to the beginning of the country's 1975 independence. Even though rich in natural resources, Mozambique has remained one of the country's least developed provinces, with a large illicit economy. That was partly due to developmental challenges common to Africa, partly to the government being distracted previously by years of civil war, and partly to exploitative government policy Al-Shabaab (also referred to as Al-Sunna wa Jama'a) is believed to have grown out of an Islamist sect that emerged around 2007 and became increasingly violent over the decade that followed.

A variety of factors made Mozambique a fertile ground for violent extremism is the province is home to the largest array of natural resources but least developed in the country, with a predominantly Muslim population that feels neglected by the largely Christian ruling elite in Maputo, the country's capital located in the south. Because the region is also home to major gas reserves which are worth more than \$50 billion USD, which foreign energy companies have been actively extracting without any of the profits benefiting local populations (Gartenstein et al, 2021).

The government of Mozambique has remained a FRELIMO-dominated institution, with the liberation-era political party staying in power since winning independence. FRELIMO runs a heavily centralized government with provinces treated subserviently, allowing their people too little voice. The RENAMO political opposition party has pressed for decentralization in negotiations, winning greater powers for provincial governors, but the power balance between Maputo and provincial capitals has remained largely unchanged.

FRELIMO generals from the liberation era, mainly of the Makonde tribe, have used their connections to dominate Cabo Delgado businesses. Corruption is rampant by local officials in cahoots with national officials trading illicit gems, wildlife, and drugs as Cabo Delgado has become a major international heroin transit point. The national government forcibly removed artisan miners from ruby fields in Montepuez in 2014 to the advantage of commercial interests, stirring unrest.

On the other hand, administrators in Maputo were yet to address the challenges of relocation and local employment that have come with the massive development of natural gas infrastructure in Cabo Delgado. The Frelimo liberation veterans enjoy a monopoly in policy-making and they used this to promote their party and individual interests at the expense of the local populace of the Cabo Delgado province which was the source of their riches. Thus, it can be argued that the insurgency problem was a result of internal policy as influenced by Frelimo party stalwarts as the main actors (Zenn, 2020).

The origins of the insurgency have been attributed to unconducive domestic policies leading to poverty, lack of socio-economic opportunities, marginalization, discrimination, inequality, and the frustrations of young people as a result of prolonged and unresolved conflict in the country. In 2017, when the first insurgent attacks were recorded, Mozambique's economy was experiencing a slowdown. According to the African Development Bank (2018), the gross domestic product (GDP) growth was 3.8% in 2016 and 3.7% in 2017, compared to an average growth of 7.3% in the previous 10 years. Mozambique's overall public sector debt accounted for 112% of the country's GDP in 2017 – way above debt sustainability thresholds. In terms of poverty prevalence, 46.1% of the population was living below the poverty line in 2017.


African Development Bank (2018) further states that economic governance deteriorated with the country recording a decreasing score of 3.3 in 2017, down from 3.6 in 2017, as ranked by the African Development Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment. This was below the continent's average, itself a reflection of the poor quality of economic policies and institutions. Youth unemployment was 41.7% in 2017. Only 29% of the national population had access to the electricity grid, whilst only 20.5% of the population had access to safely managed sanitation facilities. Almost 20% of the population was food insecure and 25% of the population experienced hunger or malnourishment in 2017. Thus, it can be argued that the insurgent outbreak in Mozambique which resulted in foreign military intervention can be attributed to poor domestic policy by the government.

Apart from the actors, historical experiences and the prevailing circumstances in both the domestic and international environment play a pivotal role in influencing policy making. Events in the domestic and international arenas have a great influence on policy determination. For example, the adoption of national lockdowns was a policy option adopted under the influence of the covid pandemic. It is pertinent to note that such policies which are reactionary in nature and often adopted under circumstances of desperation and the race against time are associated with adverse implications. Likewise, the intensification of insurgency activities, particularly in the Cabo Delgado Region of Mozambique at a scale beyond its national capability forced the nation to request and accept foreign military intervention. Based on the events in Cabo Delgado, this paper shall discuss the influence of foreign/external/international and domestic sources of the foreign policy of Mozambique which lead to the involvement of foreign military forces in the country.

## **II. THE LIMITATION OF THE DISCUSSION**

The writers decide to write the discussion of the foreign policy and the military involvement in line with the interest of Mozambique in the case of insurgency, which mostly discusses Cabo Delgado as it is the main area of military involvement that goes in line with Mozambique's Foreign Policy.

### III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK



### IV. THE CASE STUDY

Cabo Delgado is the northernmost province of Mozambique. It has an area of 82,625 km<sup>2</sup> and a population of 2,320,261 (Geohive, 2017). The province is named after Cape Delgado (Portuguese: Cabo Delgado) a coastal headland on the border between Mozambique and Tanzania, which forms the northernmost point in Mozambique. Since 2017, armed militants which often carried the Islamic State flag and have been on the offensive in the northern Mozambique province of Cabo Delgado. The human toll of this violence is grave, with more than 3,000 killed, nearly a million displaced, and an acute hunger crisis (Sheehy, 2021).

With several thousand fighters, the Islamic State-affiliated al-Shabbab has conducted increasingly sophisticated military operations, including by reportedly working with intelligence cells within the Mozambican military. The militants have also improved their tactics and weaponry, as documented by a recent International Crisis Group report. Indeed, a March assault on the city of Palma led energy giant Total to declare force majeure concerning its massive natural gas investment in Cabo Delgado.

The insurgency is taking advantage of a porous Tanzanian border and the Mozambican coast. The insurgency in the Cabo Delgado province of Mozambique has been placed firmly in the international spotlight. The insurgents finance themselves through illicit activities, including extortion and kidnapping. There is potential for the conflict to expand into neighboring provinces, also rich in natural resources and ripe for militant exploitation, and even across borders. Under a best-case scenario, the insurgency in Cabo Delgado could take several years to tame addressing it is long overdue (Sheehy, 2021).

The insurgency has had far-reaching implications within the social, economic, humanitarian, and political spheres. What was undeniable was the fact that Mozambique was not able to contain and subdue the insurgents, as they needed more capacity in terms of training, military intelligence, reconnaissance, and equipment. It is against this background that the role of SADC was considered not only unavoidable but also obligatory, consistent with the SADC Treaty and other relevant SADC and African Union (AU) instruments. Other compelling security and political factors also warrant SADC intervention in Mozambique. Key to this consideration was the fear that, if not timely resolved, the insurgency would spread throughout the region. In addition, the uprising would have disruptive effects to regional security in terms of disruption of supply chains, proliferation of refugees, hunger, poverty, human rights abuse, etc (Baptista and Kajjo, 2020).

This insurgency is involving the regional and international actors, such as the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and Rwanda who are following up on committed troop deployments and training missions, the Mozambican government and its international supporters should bring an even greater sense of urgency to this crisis. Also, with the present of the United States of America and the Russian Federation by their military training to deal with the insurgency case that happened in the Mozambique

## **V. DISCUSSION**

### **A. Mozambique Foreign Policy**

The term “*foreign policy*” has been defined in many ways. Padelford and Lincoln (1962) defined foreign policy as the key element in the process by which a state translates its broadly conceived goals and interests into concrete courses of actions to attain these objectives and pressure its interests. C.C. Rodee (1967), in other way, defined the term as “formulation and implementation of a group of principles which shape the behavior pattern of a state while negotiating with (contacting) other states to protect or further its vital interest.

Foreign policy is aimed to reach state’s national interest by using its tools such as diplomacy, foreign aid, and military force. Like many African countries with limited resources, Mozambique has been pragmatic in crafting and executing its foreign policy as an instrument to secure external support for its national interests. Mozambique’s foreign engagement has focused on carving out a policy space befitting that of a small, highly aid-dependent, low-income country in a somewhat unstable region.

At its heart, Mozambique’s foreign policy has been one of non-alignment, which has been tempered by the country’s understanding of its limitations in terms of size and stature. This has allowed Mozambique the ability to be flexible in the face of changes in the international arena (Lalbahadur and Lisa, 2013). The broad foreign-policy ambitions that are outlined in these papers are moderated by an understanding of the country’s capacity to exert power regionally and internationally.

A good Foreign Policy would obviously lead a state in fulfilling its national interests and acquiring rightful place among comity of nations. As well as the Mozambique’s foreign-policy principles (Official Publication of the Republic of Mozambique, 2010) which cover the area of defence of their sovereignty, promoting democracy, human rights, the rule of law and socio-economic development, maintaining ‘special ties of friendship’ to some particular countries, establishing new friendships based on mutual respect and solidarity, contributing to the global effort for peace and security by recognising ‘the primacy of a negotiated settlement of conflicts’, and using force only in cases of self-defence. More Broadly, the Mozambique seeks to advance a development focused agenda, is dedicated to a co-operative and multilateral approach, and is committed to making a ‘modest contribution’ towards achieving peace and prosperity in the Southern African region where the Mozambique is located.

Although history has shown that Mozambique is extraordinarily adept at reprioritizing its relationships to suit the realpolitik demands from the external environment, its greatest challenge going forward will be to harness rents from resources constructively in order to address the developmental challenges of its people. Within this principle, it has provided Mozambique with the flexibility to prioritize its foreign engagements in arrangements that best suit the exigencies of changing epochs, creating greater long-term stability. The dexterity with which Mozambique has been able to navigate this, even it is often difficult to terrain of maintaining disparate partnerships is partially the result of the skilled diplomacy of Frelimo’s leadership and its ability to maximize its impact globally relative to the country’s small size and importance in geopolitical terms. For instance, the Mozambique maintains a low profile in multilateral forums, preferring to work behind the scenes and this is become best exemplified Mozambique to assert a stronger presence in world affairs, thus is likely to become more important as the country grows in the medium term. Along with that, Mozambique would also do well to continue the value of ‘making more friends, promoting more partnership’ by pursuing a foreign policy of non-alignment which become a buffer to against the vagaries of the international system.

The Mozambique foreign policy is also dealing with the crisis which derails the government’s defense and security forces resolution to defeat the insurgents and retake the towns they occupied where Mozambique’s state forces are powerless to root out jihadi insurgents in the province of Cabo Delgado. Things to underlined is where the root causes of the jihadi insurgency are multidimensional which try to secure natural gas and oil infrastructures is as important as the need to keep stable government institutions and a functional state system.

## B. The Impact of Insurgency in Mozambique

### a. Economic

In 2017, when the first insurgent attacks were recorded, Mozambique's economy was experiencing a slowdown. According to the African Development Bank (2018), the gross domestic product (GDP) growth was 3.8% in 2016 and 3.7% in 2017, compared to the average growth of 7.3% in the previous 10 years. Mozambique's overall public sector debt accounted for 112% of the country's GDP in 2017 – way above debt sustainability thresholds. In terms of poverty prevalence, 46.1% of the population was living below the poverty line in 2017. Economic governance deteriorated, with the country recording a decreasing score of 3.3 in 2017, down from 3.6 in 2017, as ranked by the African Development Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment.

This was below the continent's average, itself a reflection of the poor quality of economic policies and institutions. Youth unemployment was 41.7% in 2017. Only 29% of the national population had access to the electricity grid, whilst only 20.5% of the population had access to safely managed sanitation facilities. Almost 20% of the population was food insecure and 25% of the population experienced hunger or malnourishment in 2017. Thus, it can be argued that the insurgent outbreak in Mozambique which resulted in foreign military intervention can be attributed to poor domestic policy by the government (ADBG, 2018).

### b. Security

In 2017, an Islamist insurgency has destabilized Cabo Delgado, resulting in a spiral of violence fuelled by poverty and hardship, similar to what has occurred in the Sahel. It is led by Ansar al-Sunna, also known locally as al-Shabaab, but has no ties to the Somali group of the same name. The organization declares its allegiance to the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP). The United States labeled it as 'ISIS Mozambique' in March 2021, but the relationship between the two groups is still being debated. Insurgents have assaulted security troops as well as people, torching villages and committing crimes. They have also temporarily taken over local towns such as Mocimboa da Praia and Palma. Massive population relocation has resulted from the fighting. The Islamist insurrection crossed over into Tanzania in October 2020, leading the two nations to strengthen their border cooperation (Zamfir, 2021).

The port of Mocimboa da Praia, the final rebel bastion in the ISIS-linked province of Cabo Delgado, has been retaken by Mozambican and Rwandan soldiers (Rwandan Defense Forces - RDF). Since the militants spread more than two years ago, fighting has risen, as have attacks on people. Last month, 1000 Rwandan troops were deployed alongside Mozambican forces as part of the 16-member South African Development Community (SADC) initiative to help Mozambique control and limit the impact of ISIS and affiliated groups in Cabo Delgado region. Awasse, a crucial town near Mocimboa da Praia, was also taken by the army. The same also with Botswana, Angola, Zimbabwe, and around 1,500 troops from the South African Defense Force, including an armored vehicle contingent, have also sent troops in recent week.

Together with the security matters, the Impacts on Mozambique's national security are multiple and include (Cheryl Hendricks and Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, 2021):

- **Personal security:** killings, mutilations, beheadings, sexual violence, the creation of internally displaced persons and refugees;
- **Economic security:** loss of jobs, loss of income, loss or disruption of subsistence activities such as farming and fishing;
- **Health security:** reduced access to health services and safe water, higher exposure to cholera, measles, malaria and COVID-19, and reduced attention to sexual and reproductive health care;
- **Political security:** attacks on people supporting the government and FRELIMO, human rights violations, torture, executions, forced disappearances and restrictions on free movement);
- **Community security:** high levels of violence against traditional Islamic communities, local cultures and habits, the rise of ethnic animosity, and direct attacks on traditional and community leaders;
- **Food security:** reduced access to food, growing hunger and malnutrition; and

- **Environmental security:** loss of habitat for subsistence farming and sustainable tourism.

Women and marginalized communities are being disproportionately affected by the war in Cabo Delgado. Many of the internally displaced are women, children, and the elderly. Women are the ones who are responsible for caring for their families in refugee camps. Women have been kidnapped, married, and raped. Children who have been orphaned and neglected, who have been denied access to education, and who have been coerced into marriage and prostitution, are the second most marginalized group.

### c. Politic

The violence's political consequences are both internal and external. Political parties, civil society organizations, the media and other prominent role players have pressed the government into asking for and accepting foreign assistance, as it could not cope with the crisis on its own. Demands for more secure interventions intensified, and the president was urged to confront corruption in the Mozambique Defense Force (FADM). The UN and the EU asked that the Mozambican government refrain from human rights violations and provide humanitarian aid (Chingotuane et al, 2021).

The Mozambique government has been obliged to react to these requests and accept aid, contradicting its previous position that it had sufficient capacity to cope with the situation on its own, thereby retaining sovereignty. Mozambique is currently 'entre an espada e a parede' (between the sword and the wall). It wants foreign assistance but is concerned that putting "boots on the ground" may exacerbate rather than alleviate the crisis. The administration is concerned not only about a vertical escalation in the form of increased terrorist attacks, increased bloodshed, and the deployment of new weaponry or suicide bombers, but also about a horizontal expansion to other provinces such as Nampula and Niassa. This could lead to the government becoming overly reliant on foreign forces.

### C. The Mozambican government's response

As part of its foreign policy, Mozambique is a member of SADC and also has bilateral security arrangements with several African nations like Zimbabwe, Rwanda and South Africa. Given the state of insurgency in Mozambique, especially the rising death toll, kidnapping and displacement of civilians, human rights abuses of people in the hands of insurgents, disruption of economic activities and the potential that the continued insurgency will have on the LNG project in Cabo Delgado, there is sufficient basis and justification for SADC to intervene in view of Mozambique's lack of capacity.

Therefore, with the SADC, the Government of Mozambique taking its cooperation. Whereas the SADC has at its disposal a number of instruments to facilitate an intervention: the SADC Treaty of 1992; the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security of 2001, and the SADC Common Agenda (as amended in 2009); the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Defence, Politics and Security (SIPO); and the SADC Mutual Defence Pact of 2003. The structures and institutions that can be used include the Summit of Heads of States or Government; Council of Ministers; Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC); and the Troika (African Union 2017).

There are four crucial factors that constitute the justification for SADC to intervene in Mozambique. First, SADC member states have a legal and moral obligation to assist another member state facing security threats and challenges. One of the objectives of SADC, as stated under Article 5 of the SADC Treaty of 1992, is "to promote peace and security" (SADC, 2015). On the other hand, under Article 2, the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security also provides that the OPDSC shall "protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, and intra-state conflict". It further obligates the OPDSC to "prevent, contain and resolve inter- and intra-state conflict by peaceful means" as well as to allow for cooperation between police and state security services to promote "community-based approaches to domestic security (SADC, 2001).

According to UNOCHA (2020) by November 2020, the insurgency in northern Mozambique had resulted in the death of over 2 400 people, the displacement of over 500 000 civilians, disrupted economic activities and worsened food insecurity. In addition to this, there is a humanitarian crisis in northern Mozambique as displaced civilians – especially children (who constitute 45% of displaced people), the elderly, women and girls, people living with disabilities, and people living with HIV/AIDS – face protection risks and are exposed to exploitation. It has also been reported that 10% of these internally displaced persons (IDPs) are staying in collective sites, which are overcrowded and have limited access to safe shelter, water and sanitation facilities. The intrastate conflict in Mozambique therefore qualifies and satisfies the conditions under which SADC is obliged to intervene in

member states, as provided under in the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security. Article 11(2)(b) of the Protocol provides that the SADC OPDSC shall seek to resolve “large scale violence between sections of the population, or between the state and sections of the population” and “a condition of civil war or insurgency” (SADC, 2001).

Thus, SADC not only has a legal basis to intervene in Mozambique, as provided for under its own legal instruments, but also has moral justification to assist Mozambicans as they continue to be exposed to death, kidnapping, abuse, displacement and all the effects of insecurity and instability posed by the insurgents. In addition, the country is facing the ramifications of COVID-19, having recorded 17 002 cases and 143 deaths as of 15 December 2020. Mozambique is also yet to fully recover from cyclones Idai and Kenneth of 2019, which claimed 603 lives, injured over 1 600 people, destroyed over 200 000 houses and left 3.8 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in the provinces of Zambezia, Sofala, Manica, Tete and Inhambane. (Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention 2020).

Second, SADC member states are legally obligated to honour commitments that they have made at the continental level under the AU through various instruments. These commitments form part of their respective foreign policies. These include the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States (1992), the OAU Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations (1994), the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999), the AU Plan of Action for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2002), and the AU Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2004), which all call for African states to cooperate in combating terrorism and insurgency through collective and collaborative approaches. Although only three SADC member countries (Lesotho, Mozambique and South Africa) have ratified the AU Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2004), and only five SADC member countries (Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Zambia and Zimbabwe) have not ratified the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism of 1999, the Protocol and the Convention entered into force in 2014 and 2002 respectively. SADC member states are therefore legitimately expected to honour the letter and spirit of these AU commitments and intervene in Mozambique, in line with the *pacta sunt servanda* principle of international law. Moreover, SADC member states, being member states of the AU, agreed in 2013 to cooperate in ending all wars, civil conflicts, violent conflicts and human rights violations under “Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020”, one of the flagship projects of the AU’s Agenda 2063 (African Union, 2017).

Third, the Government of Mozambique has requested assistance and support from SADC member states to assist in fighting insurgency in line with the procedural regularities provided for under Article 11(4) of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security. This was done officially at the SADC Extra-Ordinary Organ Troika Summit of Heads of State and Government held in Harare, Zimbabwe, on 19 May 2020 (SADC, 2020). However, there appears to be indifference or lack of political will to intervene on the part of SADC. Mozambique was requested by the SADC Summit to prepare a roadmap to address insurgency in Cabo Delgado, for consideration by the SADC Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC). However, despite the gravity of the matter, it was reported in September 2020 – four months later – that the ISDSC and ISPDC had not met, as they wanted to provide more time to Mozambique “to finalise preparations of the roadmap” and an indication of the required assistance from SADC (Government of South Africa, 2020).

According to Machado (2020) it was worrying that despite the existence of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact of 2003, which facilitates mutual cooperation in defence and security matters, Mozambique is now looking for help beyond SADC, and has requested humanitarian, logistical and capacity-building assistance from the European Union (EU) to fight the insurgency. Further, there were indications that the Wagner Group/Grupa Vagnera – a Russian private paramilitary organisation that is believed to be an arms-length unit of the Russian Ministry of Defence was providing military aid, combat troops and military equipment to Mozambique to prop up the anti-terrorism fight (Frey, 2020).

Fourth, SADC has to intervene in Mozambique, since the insurgency was threatening regional peace and security. Article 11(2)(b) of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security justifies the basis for SADC intervention if “a conflict threatens peace and security in the region or in the territory of another state”. Given the trend, nature and intensity of the insurgency in Mozambique, there was a reasonable basis to suggest that this may spill into neighbouring SADC countries if not addressed, especially those countries contiguous to Mozambique, namely Zimbabwe, Tanzania, South Africa, Eswatini, Zambia and Malawi. Already, South Africa has made it clear that Mozambique may destabilise the region, reverse regional peace gains and dividends, increase the inflow of IDPs into South Africa and neighbouring countries, and disrupt possibilities of South Africa importing

natural gas from Mozambique (DefenceWeb, 2020). According to Gerber (2020) there are security risks and challenges for SADC countries, as they fear reprisals from the insurgents if they intervene in Mozambique. Perhaps, this is why most of the bilateral and even regional engagements between Mozambique and SADC were highly classified and confidential.

For example, there were communications from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which is linked to the insurgents, to the effect that if South Africa intervenes in Mozambique, it would “open the fighting front” within South Africa’s borders. However, experiences with insurgency and terrorism elsewhere in Africa (such as Boko Haram in Nigeria; Al-Shabaab in Somalia; Ansar Dine in Mali; Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Algeria, Mali and Niger; Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi and ISIS in Libya; Islamic State West Africa Province in Nigeria and Lake Chad region; and others) present instructive lessons to Africa on how terrorist and insurgent groups easily expand their networks and recruitment base, as well as scale up their sophistry and radicalise, if they are not contained in their infancy. Insurgents in Mozambique reportedly carried out cross-border raids in the village of Kitaya in Tanzania’s Mtwara region on 14 October 2020. This prompted Tanzanian authorities to sign a memorandum of understanding with Mozambique to facilitate security cooperation along the common border (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, 2020).

Whereas the insurgency has had far-reaching implications within the social, economic, humanitarian and political spheres. What was undeniable was the fact that Mozambique was not able to contain and subdue the insurgents, as they needed more capacity in terms of training, military intelligence, reconnaissance and equipment. It is against this background that the role of SADC was considered not only unavoidable but also obligatory, consistent with the SADC Treaty and other relevant SADC and African Union (AU) instruments. Other compelling security and political factors also warrant SADC intervention in Mozambique. Key to this consideration was the fear that, if not timely resolved, the insurgency would spread throughout the region. In addition, the uprising would have disruptive effects to regional security in terms of disruption of supply chains, proliferation of refugees, hunger, poverty, human rights abuse, etc. (Baptista and Kajjo, 2020)

On 23 June, after months of discussions and prevarication, SADC’s sixteen member states agreed to deploy troops under its Standby Force to “combat terrorism and acts of violent extremism in Cabo Delgado.” Endorsing the recommendations of the technical team deployed in Mozambique following the summit held in Maputo in April 2021, which advised sending a 3,000-strong joint military force, comprising land, air and naval capabilities, this deployment falls under the framework of the SADC Mutual Defence Pact.

This new development was welcomed by many local and international observers that had advocated for southern African states to mobilise and help the Mozambican forces to restore security and ensure civilian protection against attacks in Cabo Delgado. In spite of the reservations that surround SADC’s capabilities—the organisation often being portrayed as a weaker organisation than other regional bodies on the continent, especially ECOWAS—many see in this intervention the “best chance of getting a response that is comprehensive and serves the region.” Among the main arguments in favour of a regional intervention are the risks of a violent spill-over into Mozambique’s neighbouring states and the related need for a coordinated response, including through cross-border intelligence, to manage jihadists’ infiltration. It is in regional powers’ interest to find a durable solution in order to prevent it from further escalating.

SADC had to face national authorities’ reticence to accept any interference in internal affairs and allow foreign troops on its territory. Even before the announcement was made, much debate surrounded the legal basis for such an intervention, in particular in the absence of Mozambican authorities’ consent, without which SADC would have no other option than to rely on a UN Security Council resolution. However, there has been no previous instance of SADC launching an operation without the host country’s consent.

Even though regional forces were meant to start deploying on 15 July, the initial calendar suffered some delays. These were linked to the Mozambican authorities’ late signing of the Status of Forces Agreement, required for foreign troops to operate throughout the country. However, recent reports have finally confirmed the arrival of SADC’s advance elements in Cabo Delgado. In many regards, this intervention represented a first for the regional bloc. It differs from engagements in Lesotho and the DRC in the 1990s, for which SADC authorization came after deployment. The regional bloc will not benefit from the UN umbrella and will bear full responsibility for southern African states’ engagement in the country.

In reaction to the worsening domestic environment as influenced by the insurgency (non-state actors) the government of Mozambique adopted a foreign policy which invited the deployment of foreign forces in the country. Stepping from its policy

standpoint of suspicion and lack of trust in regional military intervention, Mozambique requested assistance and support from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states at the SADC Extra-Ordinary Organ Troika Summit of Heads of State and Government, held in Harare, Zimbabwe, on 19 May 2020, to fight against the terrorist insurgency in northern Mozambique. Member states representatives committed to present the request to their respective governments for ratification and adoption of enabling policies.

Resultantly, SADC member states, at their 40th Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government meeting in August 2020, only “expressed solidarity and commitment to support Mozambique in addressing the terrorism and violent attacks” (SADC, 2020). At the SADC Extra-Ordinary Organ Troika Summit held on 27 November 2020 in Gaborone, Botswana, the regional body again “noted with concern” the ongoing insurgency in Cabo Delgado, and “expressed continued SADC solidarity with Mozambique”. Although the summit directed the urgent “finalization of a comprehensive regional response and support” to Mozambique, no concrete action has been taken thus far.

Moreover, The Government also taking its cooperation with the government of Rwanda, which is not a member of SADC. Where at the request of the Government of Mozambique, deployed a 1,000-person contingent of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and the Rwanda National Police (RNP) to Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique to assist. The Joint Force will work closely with Mozambique Armed Defence Forces (FADM) and forces from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in designated sectors of responsibility. The Rwandan contingent will support efforts to restore Mozambican state authority by conducting combat and security operations, as well as stabilisation and security-sector reform (SSR). According to Cascais (2021) this approach was probably negotiated at the highest political level between Mozambique, France and Rwanda." For France, moving the biggest gas project in Africa forward is vital, and Paris was even prepared to send troops to secure its interests in northern Mozambique.

In Mozambique, though, there was opposition to allowing a French military presence in Cabo Delgado. So, the solution was for Rwandan troops to fill the void and be paid handsomely from both a financial and political perspective. This deployment is based on the good bilateral relations between the Republic of Rwanda and the Republic of Mozambique, following the signing of several agreements between the two countries in 2018, and is grounded in Rwanda's commitment to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine and the 2015 Kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians (Republic of Rwanda, 9 July 2021).

## **VI. CONCLUSION**

Armed militarism often raises the IS flag and has been attacking in the province of Cabo del Gado in northern Mozambique since 2017. The high number of victims killed in the attack forced the Mozambican government to adopt policies related to riots. Regional and international stakeholders, namely the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Rwanda and the European Union, are pursuing committed military deployment and training missions, while the Government of Mozambique and its international supporters are at stake. We must increase the urgency.

History shows that Mozambique is very proficient in resetting relations priorities to meet the actual political demands of the external environment, but its biggest challenge is dealing with the population. A way to constructively use resource revenues to address development challenges. Under this principle, Mozambique has given the flexibility to prioritize foreign involvement in agreements that best reflect the urgency of change in order to create longer-term stability. One of them is the involvement of SADC.

The uprising in Mozambique is widespread and its political, security, humanitarian and cross-border impacts are widespread. The SADC has legal, moral, and safety reasons for intervention in Mozambique. In terms of military provision, technical training, information gathering and information exchange, military equipment and coverage through maritime security cooperation, South Africa in particular has military power in terms of technological advancement, logistical support, operational or logistical capabilities. This proves that the SADC also has the discretion to facilitate or mediate negotiations between the Government of Mozambique and interlocutors identified by rebel groups.

Along with that, Mozambique Foreign Policy seeks to advance a development focused agenda, is dedicated to a co-operative and multilateral approach, and is committed to making a ‘modest contribution’ towards achieving peace and prosperity also dealing with the crisis which derails the government's defense and security forces resolution by increasing its national capability forced the nation to request for and accept foreign military intervention to defeat the insurgents which happened in

Cabo Delgado. From this research, it can be also be concluded that the government and the wider Mozambique community need to consider regional and international stakeholders that meet social, political and economic needs in order to build community resilience, empowerment and inclusion of women and youth, protect civilians, and also strengthen the security sector and local government as it is important as the need to keep stable government institutions and the peace functional state system.

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