

Indonesia's Maritime Defense Strategy And Conditions In The Southeast Asian Region

Rizky Thesalonika Yulyanti

Sea Defense Strategy Study Program

Faculty of Defense Strategy Republic of Indonesia Defense University

Indonesia

rizkythesalonika@gmail.com



Abstract – The Southeast Asian Region Is Geographically Very Strategic And Can Be Directly Influenced By The Larger Political Forces Of The World. The Potential Natural Wealth Contained In Southeast Asia Is Undoubtedly A Target For Stakeholders To Increase Their Influence. The Influence Of Major Countries In Asia, Such As China, Has Tremendous Power On ASEAN Countries' Decision-Making Process In Carrying Out Their Maritime Strategies. From The Point Of View Of ASEAN Countries, It Is Necessary To Have Cooperative Actions Between Countries In The Region To Maintain The Influence And Independence Of Decisions. On This Basis, The ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) Was Formed As A Forum For ASEAN Countries To Make Decisions And Determine Strategies In The Maritime Sector.

Keywords – ASEAN, Southeast Asia, Maritime, Strategy

I. INTRODUCTION

The sea is an infinite resource used throughout human history for transportation, food sources, recreation, offshore mining, and ocean trade, and as a medium for projecting national power. The increasing importance of the ocean in the era of globalization in the 21st century is marked by the growing flow of international maritime trade based on the excellence of Adam Smith's absolute and comparative advantage, according to David Ricardo (Revelation, 2016). Business on a global scale is crucial, with market integration and international cooperation enabling individuals, companies, and countries to gain faster and cheaper access to global markets (Friedman, 1999).

The sea has always been the main focus of humanity and international relations. Historically, the contribution of the ocean to human development can be seen from at least four attributes, which Geoffrey Till said were interrelated and interdependent. The sea becomes important for existing resources as a means of transportation and trade, as well as a means of exchanging information and as a power source (Till, 2009). The role of this sea is increasingly significant in the current era because maritime Defense is a symbol of the globalization of goods or logistics that will be distributed, sold, and consumed throughout the world. In addition, the opportunity for us to explore the sea more deeply because the sea has much information becomes a great opportunity for humans to research the ocean.

Maritime defense exists in two different thought interactions: between groups that use traditional frameworks on maritime security and non-traditional frameworks on aquatic security concepts. Views on traditional groups are more likely to limit the idea of security (de-securitization), whereas non-traditional groups tend to expand it (Buzan, 1990). If we talk about maritime security, it cannot be separated from the thinking of Hoyt and Buzan, which of course, is related to maritime security in a non-traditional or traditional way. Along with the development of the times, a document was issued by the Informal Consultative Process that

discusses maritime security in depth. The United Nations issued the document under UN General Assembly Resolution (Resolution 54/33 1999). There are essential points in the paper, namely:

1. There is no official statement relating to maritime security at ICP because maritime security is often considered related to non-crime at sea. So that the UN carries out the identification of marine security issues, which are then linked to threats in the sea (in Makmur) as follows:
 - Acts of terrorism committed on ships and offshore installations.
 - Armed piracy and hijacking of ships at sea
 - Illegal drug trafficking
2. The theory regarding maritime security is comprehensive and officially described in the ICP document.

By looking at the White Defense Papers and Maritime Policies of countries whose geographical conditions are in the region of two oceans, especially China, India and Indonesia, these countries must pay attention to maritime needs to achieve their national interests. From the Indonesian perspective, President Jokowi has mentioned the vision of becoming a "Global Maritime Fulcrum", which departs from the idea that in the geo-economic and geopolitical world, which has now shifted from West to East and especially with Indonesia's strategic position, the Indonesian sea takes an increasingly important role (Widodo, 2015). Indonesia's maritime doctrine adheres to five pillars: (1) commitment to encourage the development of maritime infrastructure and maritime connectivity, (2) commitment to developing services and industries for the management of marine natural resources and the marine environment, and (3) development of maritime cooperation through maritime. Diplomacy, (4) rebuilding Indonesia's maritime culture, and (5) building maritime defence and security.

In the late 1990s, ASEAN discussed on regional cooperation in maritime security. The 1998 Hanoi Declaration and the subsequent 1999 Plan of Action to combat cross-border crime show a regional focus on piracy and armed robbery. This statement was issued in response to the rise in piracy and armed robbery after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The Hanoi Declaration only mentions the need to "strengthen individual and collective efforts" to combat piracy and other cross-border crimes, but piracy is of particular concern to ASEAN member states. The Action Plan is also cross-border by establishing the Center for Fighting Cross-Border Crime in ASEAN (ACTC) and placing the ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cross-Border Crime as the main political decision-making body related to crime.

However, while these responses are primarily limited to cross-border crimes, and copyright infringement falls into this category, the action plan does not provide specific guidance on regional responses to copyright infringement. In this sense, maritime security is still seen in the narrow sense of cross-border crime, which must be dealt with individually by the Member States. The ARF issued a more specific call to action in June 2003. The joint statement noted maritime security's critical and fundamental nature and the urgency to extensively strengthen regional security and cooperation efforts between relevant maritime law enforcement agencies. (Nasu et al., 2019).

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Maritime Defense Strategy

Seeing how important a country is in carrying out a maritime defense strategy, of course, can be a focus in spreading the country's influence, as done by China, which is now formulating its maritime strategy. In doing so, China is undergoing a process in which Chinese civil servants develop and clarify their strategy, mobilize state institutions and prioritize critical systems, in this case, the goals set in the development framework. This is because they recognize the contradictions created by Chinese socialism, which is still in its infancy and makes material and cultural needs.

In this context, the Maritime Silk Road in China can be interpreted as a vision that facilitates and is developed by combining military, economic, and diplomatic forces to create an international situation. The concept refers to a series of infrastructure projects connecting land lines between China and Central Asia, Russia and Europe, as well as sea lanes between China and the Indian Ocean through the South China Sea (CSIS, 2018).

In the Southeast Asian region, maritime defense-related issues are manifested in defense diplomacy conducted bilaterally and multilaterally. Cooperation between countries in the Southeast Asian region is divided into four collaboration patterns. The

first pattern relates to specific security issues, external powers, and Southeast Asian countries implementing multilateral defense cooperation. The second pattern is to enforce agreements with strategic partners and allies led by the United States in the context of regional defense and security cooperation. The third pattern is to focus on non-traditional security issues of multilateral cooperation with East Asian countries to involve ASEAN in the East Asian region, led by China. The last pattern is the fourth is ASEAN as a centre for strengthening multilateral security cooperation between member states and partners, as well as between member states of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

The threats in the maritime sector are inseparable from sovereignty issues and territorial disputes. For this reason, it is necessary to build mutual trust, so there is no suspicion in cooperation. Regarding the issue of maritime defense cooperation, the threat of cross-border crime through sea lanes is not only a problem for one country but a common problem. ASEAN needs to expand the scope of maritime security management, such as border security cooperation, high seas cooperation, and strategic international trade route cooperation, as a regional community that serves as a forum for each member state (Hendra, 2018).

Based on Liddle Hart's thinking, strategy is a skill or art that, in its application, uses military means to achieve a policy's ultimate goal (Hart, 1967). Indonesia's sea defense resources have been implemented to support the total defense system but cannot gain absolute control. In the book *Operational Warfare at Sea* written by Milan Vego (2008) on ocean control, resources are necessary to support marine control strategies at specific points, including ways, resources, and goals (Vego, 2008). From the perspective of resources, cooperation between countries is needed both bilaterally and regionally in using the sea. Using marine resources at a certain level gives countries within the sea area the to use the ocean without interference from other parties.

2.2. Sea Power

Alfred Thayer Mahan, a United States Naval Officer, put forward the theory that sea power is the most important element for the advancement and glory of a country, which if these sea powers are empowered, it will improve the welfare and security of a country. In contrast, if sea power is neglected, it will result in losses for a country or even bring down the country.

In the book 'The Influence of Sea Power Upon History' Alfred Thayer Mahan makes a credo that the development of a nation's maritime power is determined by its geography, geographical shapes, area and natural resources, population, national character and the character of its government. According to Mahan, the glory of a nation at sea is determined by the existence of a fleet of sea power and sea force (Mahan, 1890). The sea power Mahan refers to is the commercial shipping fleet, supporting facilities and harbours, while the sea force is the Navy in charge of protecting commercial shipping. The Navy must be able to able to create command of the sea so that the sea can be utilised for its own benefit and the enemy cannot utilise it.

Dr Marsetyo states that sea power can be defined as a country with adequate and proportional naval power. Sea power also means the ability of a country in using and control the sea (sea control) and the ability to prevent enemies from using it (sea denial). The key components of sea power as input are the elements of national power at sea, including law enforcement officers, maritime defence industry, natural resources and human resources (Nainggolan, 2017). Meanwhile, sea power as an output is a consequence of the ability to manage the sea and the ability to influence the behaviour of state or non-state either at and or through the sea.

III. RESEARCH METHODS

In this study, the researcher used a qualitative research method. The information collected by qualitative researchers helps gain insight into the data they want to obtain in the form of narratives. Narratives can be obtained through interviews or conducting literature reviews. In addition to being able to on qualitative research can be obtained through works of art, audio or video, journalism, or can even be generated from close observation and carried out systematically on the people or phenomena being studied.

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Military Power in Southeast Asia

The Global Firepower Index (GFI) value is related to the military power possessed by a country. The points that determine the assessment of the index value are based on the country's human resources, land power, sea power, air power, natural resources, military science, financial and geographical conditions, and are the army's leading defense equipment for defense, including (defense equipment).

Based on the World Thermal Power Ranking 2021, Indonesia (0.2684) is ranked 16th in the world and 1st in Southeast Asia after Australia (0.3378). However, Indonesia still has homework to meet the Minimum Essential Forces (MEF) by optimizing the strengthening of the domestic defense industry.

Here is the order of countries by GFI in the Southeast Asian region. The closer to 0 can be interpreted as the better the military strength (Slamet, 2021):

1. Indonesia (0,2684)
2. Australia (0,3378)
3. Vietnam (0,4189)
4. Thailand (0,4427)
5. Myanmar (0,6521)
6. Singapore (0,6931)
7. Malaysia (0,7451)
8. Philippines (0,8219)
9. Cambodia (2,2751)
10. Laos (3,3003)

Brunei Darussalam, Papua New Guinea, and Timor Leste are not included in the 140 countries measured by global firepower. Some sources say the military strength in the three countries tends to be very weak.

4.2. Defense Equipment of ASEAN Countries

Richard A. Bitzinger from the Nanyang University of Technology, who is a military observer, stated a conclusion that the simple and initially defense-oriented ASEAN maritime defense forces in coastal areas (brown water) have now developed into a more modern force (green water) (Aqwam, 2017). This more modern force can predict the weapons necessary to cover thousands of miles to reach the outermost areas of regional waters. Some ships, such as corvettes, frigates, or even larger vessels, including submarines, are means of defense closely related to today's modern forces.

Bitzinger also thinks that since 2008 countries in the world, especially those directly adjacent to the South China Sea, have been increasingly aggressive in modernizing their maritime defense forces. Like Malaysia, which added 6 Gowind Class Corvettes from France and 2 F2000 frigates from England to be part of its maritime defense force. Singapore also brought in 6 Formidable-class frigates with Lafayette designs from the same country, France. Meanwhile, until 2016, Vietnam added 4 Russian-made Gepard-type 3.9 frigates. This year, Russia assisted Vietnam in modernizing the Vietnamese Navy's missile defense system on two Vietnamese Navy corvettes, Moiniya and Tarantul. Vietnam is currently the country with the strongest Navy among ASEAN countries 6 (six) Kilo-class submarines ordered from Russia this year are also in service.

Another country that is included aggressively in this modernization is the Philippines. This can be seen from the Philippines' action to bring in used frigates and corvettes numbering dozens of pieces from Italy, the United States, Japan, and Italy in the past five years. Thailand took similar action by controlling eight corvettes and seven frigates and trying to establish close ties with the United States to increase the strength of the Thai royal fleet and increase the number of ships now dominated by old ships. One of the senior researchers at HIS, Ben Moores, said that ASEAN countries are no longer interested in maritime defense equipment from the United States. This was told CNBC (in Aqwam, 2017). For example, the Vietnamese state, since 2010, has relied on Russia to procure nearly 72 per cent of its weapons.

Indonesia has a contract of about 9.7% with the United States of total purchases, and Malaysia has an agreement of about 3.3% with the United States of total assets. The Philippines, as a country relatively close to America, also only provides 30% of the United States military industry. For Singapore, which has a reasonably high percentage of military spending with the United States, up to 40% also made purchases to add squadrons of F-15E, F-16E, and Apache helicopters not aimed at strengthening the marine fleet. According to Moores, the United States is less attractive when compared to other defense equipment suppliers such

as the United Kingdom, Spain, Japan, Brazil, South Korea, and France. Based on Global Fire Power data, the Indonesian Navy currently has 24 corvettes, seven frigates, and four active submarines. Some defense equipment, such as Warships Of The Republic Of Indonesia (KRI) Gusti Ngurah Rai, Warships Of The Republic Of Indonesia (KRI) Martadinata, and Nagapasa Submarine, is new. However, almost 70% of Indonesian National Army (TNI) defense equipment is over 20 (twenty) years old. So it can be said that the modernization of defense equipment belonging to the Indonesian Navy is carried out (Aqwan, 2017).

4.3. The Importance of Regional Maritime Defense Cooperation

Nevertheless, this regional maritime partnership can be a test for ASEAN's unity and centrality. As an administrative region, ASEAN's main task is to accommodate its diverse member states. Interests and abilities. In addition, as a unified actor in the region, ASEAN needs to align the interests of its member states with the interests of external forces. That's tricky for ASEAN, especially after experiencing the first year of the ASEAN Community. In such a case, ASEAN member states need to establish a common perception of conflicting issues because they share the same concern on the same problem. In addition, as an organization, ASEAN needs to ensure that each of its member states' bilateral and/or multilateral cooperation is not to the detriment of other ASEAN member states' interests.

The importance and vulnerability of the Southeast Asia and East Asia Regions, combined with their maritime security, have urged the great powers in the region to launch their respective maritime and defense strategies that are essential to advancing the nation's prosperity and security and regional stability. As a united actor in the region, ASEAN must also play its part in following its responsibilities by looking at the common concerns of its members and colleagues. On the South China Sea issue, ASEAN has undertaken several internal mechanisms to resolve the case but failed to reach an agreement. However, ASEAN-led external mechanisms can be used to resolve disputes at sea. Speaking as one unified actor, ASEAN must exercise its leadership and centrality in the Regional Maritime Partnership and Cooperation, engaging other pacific nations and ASEAN partners, notably China, South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the US. With this, ASEAN needs more steps in building trust to build common perceptions with commonalities, concerns among its member states as well as to ensure its member states not harmed from bilateral and/or multilateral partnerships with external forces.

4.4. Present Maritime Conditions

The ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) was formed in to hope that Southeast Asia will be more serious in improving maritime security in the ASEAN region, especially at the choke point through defense cooperation in the sea area. One of AMF's visions, namely marine collaboration, has received positive responses from ASEAN members, especially countries such as Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, whose economic cooperation, especially international trade, uses sea routes. Each country certainly has its interests both in their political, economic and national interests, but in terms of maintaining stability for the region, it is mandatory to increase mutual defense by each State because this will affect the smooth running of any interests or goals to be achieved. ASEAN is expected to prevent the opportunity for piracy to become increasingly uncontrollable, maritime infrastructure to be increasingly used by criminals and terrorists at sea so that the threats that occur at sea continue to increase. The AMF will discuss maritime-related cross-cutting issues and then provide advice to relevant sectors. In addition, the AMF will support the acceleration of realizing the ASEAN community through three pillars related to maritime matters.

The formation of the AMF is seen as necessary for various reasons, namely the importance of the waters and seas in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea in terms of the economy. Trade, Transport, and Communication across ASEAN countries and global maritime powers. Coordination and synergy of ASEAN sectoral bodies are needed because the Southeast Asian region has the potential for conflict at sea. So these things are considered necessary to get exceptional seriousness between countries to pay more attention to the maritime area in the Southeast Asian Region.

4.5. ASEAN Maritime in the Future

Along with the development of the economy and information and communication technology, threats to security in the Southeast Asian sea area also continue to increase. As one of the key players, ASEAN member states are expected to be able to develop strategies that are considered adequate for member states in addressing issues related to maritime security threats (Admin, 2020). ASEAN faces the potential for more violent piracy, the exploitation of maritime assets with increasing acts of terrorism, and the increasing threat to shipping. In certain situations, procedures and measures of prevention, deterrence, denial, detection, mitigation, or response are designed to reduce security threats appropriately.

Therefore, researchers are certainly looking forward to seeing the future of the AMF as a reflection of ASEAN's broader concerns about maritime instability through the proposed strategic blueprint. This method not only strengthens ASEAN maritime cooperation but also continuously updates ASEAN maritime security-related issues, faces new challenges, and makes the old issues of Southeast Asian maritime security more effective. As mentioned earlier, the sea is a source of various dangers, especially threatening national security. A more successful response to maritime security threats requires regional cooperation and collective action. Action alone is certainly not enough. In the next decade, we will find a remarkable joint movement in ASEAN maritime security and the factors contributing to more cooperative action.

V. CONCLUSION

ASEAN should further promote and pay significant attention to maritime security defense cooperation. In a broader sense, the association occurs when a country seeks to achieve its goals and changes its policies to meet the security preferences of other countries. This defense cooperation can be applied to countries in the Southeast Asian region. Actions to address threats to the Asian sea region can be carried out with direct supervision from strategic-level governments through middle-level personnel in ASEAN countries.

Maritime defense and security will continue to be ASEAN's top concern, significantly as the new cycle of globalization will change the way it is built from the sea unless ASEAN considers: A network of security cooperation that reflects the current development status of maritime issues. (2) Local security interests. (3) Socialization of norms in cooperation, (4) Priority of maritime security, and (5) Improvement, mobilization and strengthening of national resources. The ASEAN Political-Security Community is the most appropriate body in echoing related maritime security defense cooperation of countries in the Southeast Asian region. ASEAN countries are expected to be able to increase their sense of openness and be more responsive in recognizing maritime security issues and realizing effective and sustainable maritime defense cooperation.

REFERENCES

- [1] Admin. 2012. Asia Tenggara Ramai-ramai Belanja Alat Pertahanan Maritim. <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/asia-tenggara-ramai-ramai-belanja-alat-pertahanan-maritim/1522260.html>. Accessed on 25 June 2022
- [2] Admin. 2020. Isu Keamanan Maritim Regional. <https://www.tabloiddiplomasi.org/isu-keamanan-maritim-regional/>. Accessed on 25 June 2022
- [3] Alfred Thayer Mahan. 1890. The Influence of Seapower on History. Gutenberg.org.
- [4] Aqwm Fiazmi. 2017. ASEAN Mempercanggih Armada, Bersiaga Hadapi Cina. <https://tirto.id/asean-mempercanggih-armada-bersiaga-hadapi-cina-cxP5>. Accessed on 26 June 2022
- [5] Barry Buzan, Waever Ole, and de Wilde Jaap. 1990. Security a New Frame Work For Analysis. Colorado : Lynne Reinner Publisher
- [6] Centre for Strategic and InteDiplomasi Pertahanan Maritim: Strategi, Tantangan, dan Prospek nasional Studies. 2018. Jakarta : Agency for Policy Assessment and Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia.
- [7] Friedman, T.L. 1999. The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: Anchor.
- [8] Till, G. 2009. Globalization: implications of and for the modern/post-modern navies of the Asia Pacific.
- [9] Hart, L. 1967. Strategy (Second Rev). Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers. <https://www.classicsofstrategy.com/2016/01/liddell-hart-strategy1954.html>
- [10] Hendra Maujana Saragih. 2018. Diplomasi Pertahanan Indonesia Dalam Konflik Laut China Selatan. Journal of Political Science and Communication. Vol 8 (1)
- [11] Jeremia Nainggolan. 2017. Indonesian Sea Power. Indonesian Journal of International Law, Vol 14(3), pp.419-420.
- [12] Makmur Khaliat. 2009. Keamanan Maritim Dan Implikasinya Bagi Indonesia, Journal of Social and Political Sciences, Vol 13 (1)

- [13] Nasu, H., McLaughlin, R., Rothwell, D. R., & Tan, S. S. 2019. *The Legal Authority of ASEAN as a Security Institution*. Cambridge University Press.
- [14] Slamet. 2021. Kekuatan Alutsista di Kawasan Asia Tenggara. <https://kompaspedia.kompas.id/baca/infografik/peta-tematik/kekuatan-alutsista-di-kawasan-asia-tenggara>. Accessed on 25 June 2022
- [15] Trialen Lumban Gaol. 2017. Peran Asean Maritime Forum (AMF) Dalam Menjaga Keamanan Maritim (Studi Kasus Perompakan Di Perairan Selat Malaka). *Jom FISIP* Vol 4 (1) 1 – 9
- [16] Vego, M. N. 2008. *Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice* (2nd Editio). Routledge. <https://doi.org/0367594943>
- [17] Wahyu Wardhana. 2016. Maritime Fulcrum: A Maritime History And Defense Economy Framework. *Journal of Society and Culture*. Vol 18 (3) 369 – 386