

Synergy Between Ministries/Institutions In Dealing With Non Military Threats In The Sunda Straits

Salsabila Naura Mawaddah¹, Buddy Suseto², M. Ikhwan Syahtaria³

^{1, 2, 3}Marine Defense Strategy Study Program

Faculty of Defense Strategy Republic of Indonesia Defense University

Indonesia

¹bila.naura01@gmail.com



Abstract – The Sunda Strait is one of the narrow straits that is actively used both for international shipping and for national shipping which causes traffic density and the emergence of non-military threats coming by sea. In dealing with all these threats, it is necessary to have a synergy between Ministries/Institutions that is carried out optimally to be able to reduce the level of non-military threats that occur in the Sunda Strait. The purpose of carrying out this research is to analyze the implementation of the equality strategy in Ministry/Institutions entities and optimize coordination between Ministries/Institutions to be able to reduce the level of non-military threats in the Sunda Strait. This study uses qualitative methods and a phenomenological approach. The results of this study indicate that there are three factors in the implementation of the equality strategy in Ministry/Institutions entities, namely coordination or synergy, intelligence data collection, and patterns of operations. In addition, two factors were found that influenced the optimization of coordination between Ministries/Institutions, namely policies and constraints. Therefore, synergy or coordination between Ministries/Institutions is needed to collect intelligence data which becomes the basis for being able to carry out operations both independently and when carrying out joint operations. In addition, optimizing the synergy between Ministries/Institutions requires a policy that is strong in nature so that it can cover all related Ministries/Institutions.

Keywords – Ministries/Institutions, Non Military Threats, Sunda Straits, Synergy

I. INTRODUCTION

Indonesia is the largest archipelagic country and also a maritime country which can be defined as a country that is surrounded by maritime areas by giving a broad impression in geographical, economic and strategic dimensions (Menhinick, 2003). Indonesia is geographically located at the crossroads of two continents, the Asian continent and the Australian continent, as well as two oceans, namely the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. The vast territorial waters of Indonesia and geographical factors cause many foreign ships to pass through. Referring to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Indonesia has three Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Lanes or ALKI I, II, and III. Archipelagic Sea Lanes are channels both at sea and on sea lanes used by foreign ships or aircraft to pass, sail or carry out flights in the normal way for transit which is carried out continuously, directly and as quickly as possible over archipelagic waters and the territorial sea which is also adjacent to the Exclusive Economic Zone (ZEE) (UU No. 6 of 1996).

In addition to having archipelagic sea lanes which are actively used by international shipping, Indonesia also has five choke points or narrow straits which are important international trade routes, namely the Malacca Strait, the Sunda Strait, the Lombok Strait, the Wetar Strait and the Ombai Strait (Menon, 1998). The narrow strait is also a route for oil and gas transportation to meet energy needs in East Asia which crosses the Sunda Strait, Malacca Strait and Lombok Strait, so the three

straits are said to be vital straits for countries in East Asia (Sobaruddin et al. al., 2017). However, there has been instability in trade flows to Australia, especially those that pass through the Lombok Strait, the Sunda Strait and also the Malacca Strait. In the Lombok Strait there were 933 ships passing through the strait, but the number of ships bound for Australia was only 904, then in the Malacca Strait the number of ships entering was 236 and 175 leaving; and in the Sunda Strait there are 814 ships entering the strait and only 764 ships leaving (Suseto et al., 2021).

From the data mentioned in Suseto et al. (2017), it is known that the Sunda Strait is a strait that is actively used by ships of various types to pass. The Sunda Strait is known as the shortest alternative route and has profitable potential because of its position, and proves that the Sunda Strait is needed because many countries depend on this trade channel (Pranoto, 2012). Geographically the Sunda Strait is part of the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea Channels (ALKI) I which connects the waters of the Indian Ocean by passing through the Karimata Strait and then heading to the North Natuna Sea (Sobaruddin, et al., 2017). The density that occurs in the Sunda Strait is also caused by shipping originating from the Port of Merak to the Port of Bakauheni and vice versa, the density of shipping lanes or traffic density is monitored through the Automatic Identification System (AIS) as shown in Figure 1.1.

In the Annex to the Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia (Perpres RI) No. 7 of 2008, concerning the General Policy of State Defense. "Non-military threats are threats made by non-state actors to territorial integrity, state sovereignty, and the safety of the Indonesian nation. "Non-military threats are potential threats currently faced by Indonesia. Included in this threat are armed separatist movements, international and domestic terrorism, radical actions, theft of natural resources, smuggling, transnational crime, and various other large-scale forms of illegal actions. "

Meanwhile, Octavian summarized from the above eight types of crimes into five types of crimes that have a very strong maritime dimension, namely, terrorism, piracy at sea, arms smuggling, human trafficking, and drug (Octavian, 2015, p. 28). The indication of crime presented by Octavian is a form of threat that is also rampant. One example of the phenomenon that researchers obtained from the results of the report of the Head of the Indonesian Maritime Security Institutions (Bakamla) regarding a recap of the number of violations that occurred in Indonesian waters from 2015-2019, as presented in the following table:



Fig.11. Traffic Density in the Sunda Strait

Source: Puskodal Lanal Banten dalam (Sobaruddin et al., 2017)

With the fact that the Sunda Strait is one of the lanes that are actively used in international shipping, it is only natural that the Sunda Strait is passed through and crowded with cargo ships, tankers, tugboats, fishing boats, and also military ships passing from the Indian Ocean to Java Sea or vice versa. Due to the busy traffic situation, the government issued Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia Number 16 of 2017 concerning Indonesian Maritime Policy through the pillars contained therein, one of which concerns Defense, Security, Law Enforcement, and also Safety at Sea (RI Presidential Regulation No. 16, 2017). The condition of the Sunda Strait which is used for international traffic and can also be said to be 'open', it cannot be denied that there will be threats that come and disrupt state sovereignty.

Based on Law no. 23 of 2019 Article 4 Paragraph (2) concerning Management of National Resources for National Defense, threats are divided into three categories, namely military threats, non-military threats, and/or hybrid threats. Military threats can be interpreted as threats made by the military from one country to another country. While non-military threats are threats that use non-military factors but are considered capable of endangering state sovereignty, state territorial integrity, and also the safety of the entire nation. Non-military threats are divided into several groups, including threats with ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, information and technology dimensions, as well as public safety. Forms of non-military threats can also be divided into two (Abidin, et al., 2014), namely:

- a. The first form of non-military threat is a threat directly related to national defense.
- b. The second form is non-military threats that are not directly related to national defense.

Until now it has been proven that there are non-military threats in the Sunda Strait, including:

- a. The sinking of the KMP Bahuga Jaya ferry which was caused by a collision with the tanker MT Norgas Cathinka in the Sunda Strait, in September 2012.
- b. The smuggling of crystal methamphetamine weighing 54 kg and 40,894 ecstasy pills was successfully thwarted at Merak Harbor in 2016.
- c. The arrest of a Wanderlust ship in July 2017 that smuggled 1 ton of methamphetamine smuggled by a Taiwanese citizen at Anyer Beach in the waters of the Sunda Serang Strait, Banten.
- d. The tsunami caused by the eruption of Mount Anak Krakatau in the Sunda Strait in December 2018.
- e. Fisherman boat accident KM Puspita Jaya in June 2020.
- f. The discovery of 21 packages of methamphetamine type narcotics weighing 436.30 kg on one of the islands in the Thousand Islands, in 2021.
- g. The discovery of 21 packages of methamphetamine type narcotics weighing 436.30 kg on one of the islands in the Thousand Islands, in 2021.
- h. Smuggling of 179 kg of cocaine in the Sunda Strait around Merak Harbor, Banten, in May 2022.
- i. Circulation of counterfeit money at KM Royce I who was sailing in the waters of the Sunda Strait amounting to Rp. 66 Million, in January 2023.

Referring to the above, the non-military threat that is a concern for the Sunda Strait region is the smuggling of narcotics and illegal drugs. Actually, each ALKI has various and different potential threats. The threats that exist in ALKI I relate to the impact of conflicting territorial claims over the Spratly and Paracel islands in the North Natuna Sea. Threats that come can be military or non-military, one of which is the activity carried out by pirates while avoiding pursuit by security forces, smuggling, human trafficking, as well as the potential threat of natural disasters. Recently there was also a case that was successfully thwarted by Lanal Banten, namely the smuggling of counterfeit notes in the Rp. 10,000 with a total of 6600 pieces (Hadi, 2023). This activity was thwarted when there was a transaction on KM Royce 1 which sailed from the Port of Merak to the Port of Bakauheni. As written in table 1.1, there is a threat in the form of natural disasters caused by the Anak Krakatau volcano which is currently active. "

As for several cases that have occurred in the Sunda Strait, the quantity of prohibited goods that have managed to enter the territorial waters and be caught is enormous. The majority of Indonesia's geographical conditions are territorial waters or sea used

by international syndicates as narcotics and illegal drugs smuggling routes. This was supported by the Head of the National Narcotics Institutions at the event held at the Republic of Indonesia National Defense Institute with the title "Synergize to Save Generations and Protect the Country from the Threat of Drug Crime" which stated that 80% of narcotics smuggling to Indonesia was by sea (Winarko, 2019). The Sunda Strait can be said to be a strategic water area to serve as a narcotics smuggling route because the strait faces directly the coast of Banten Beach which has minimal security and guard (Munandar, 2017). The cases of smuggling mentioned above show that the Sunda Strait requires stricter security and guarding to be able to suppress the level of smuggling of narcotics and illegal drugs.

At the Indonesian Maritime Security Coordination Meeting held by Bakamla online which was also attended by the Commander of Fleet Command I (Pangkoarmada I) at Mako Koarmada I, it was explained that the current conditions required fast and precise handling, especially in this implementation requiring synergy from maritime stakeholders. The latest conditions explained in the coordination meeting include the rampant drug smuggling, IUU fishing, sea accidents which are still high and human rights violations (Koarmada I, 2020). The purpose of the coordination meeting is to unify the mindset, attitude patterns, and action patterns of the ministries/Institutions in the sea to secure Indonesian waters. The form of synergy that is expected is by carrying out cooperation in the form of holding joint operations and training, in addition to that also by exchanging information and building mutual capacity to work together in perfecting the concept of security to protect Indonesian waters.

As mentioned above, synergy is expected to reduce the number of potential threats, this is also based on PP Number 13 of 2022 concerning Implementation of Security, Safety and Law Enforcement in the Indonesian Jurisdiction Area. In PP No. 13 of 2022 it is explained that joint patrols are organized by the Institutions by involving Relevant Institutions and Technical Institutions jointly, in an integrated and integrated way.

The real form of Government Regulation Number 13 of 2022 is the holding of joint patrols carried out by patrol assets including the Indonesian Navy, Air Force, Maritime and Fishery Resources Monitoring (PSDKP), Directorate General of Customs and Excise (DJBC), and Republican Sea and Coast Guard Unit Indonesia (KPLP), and Bakamla RI (Bakamla RI, 2022). The purpose of implementing this Joint Patrol is to improve security and safety in Indonesian territorial waters and Indonesian jurisdiction. In addition, the Head of Bakamla RI Rear Admiral TNI Dr. Aan Kurnia added that the Joint Patrol was held as an effort to create synergies so that patrols are carried out effectively and efficiently in the use of resources while still prioritizing the aspect of national security.

The holding of Joint Patrols which was inaugurated by Bakamla RI in 2022 yesterday is also proof that without optimal cooperation between law enforcers at sea, sea security and safety cannot be realized (Bakamla RI, 2022). In addition to the embodiment of PP Number 13 of 2022, the Joint Patrol is also a manifestation of the Decree of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Number 74 of 2022 concerning plans for patrols on a national scale. Synergy, coordination or cooperation is also stated in Presidential Regulation Number 8 of 2021 concerning the General Policy of National Defense for 2020-2024. In Presidential Regulation Number 8 of 2021 it is explained that cooperation between ministries, Institutions and local governments is directed at increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of work mechanisms and processes so that they are carried out more quickly and precisely through coordination, collaboration, integration and synchronization between the main elements and other elements of national strength in dealing with non-military threats in accordance with their duties and functions (Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, 2021). The authorities and mechanisms for implementing non-military defense include, among others:

1. Ministries/Institutions as the main elements carry out:
 - a. Compilation and/or alignment of policies and strategies to prevent and deal with threats according to the dimensions and types of threats.
 - b. Compilation and/or alignment of threat prevention and management program plans according to the dimensions and types of threats.
 - c. Prevention and management of threats with ministries/Institutions and local governments as supporters according to the dimensions and types of threats.
 - d. Intervention and assessment of strategic issues that have the potential to become threats according to the dimensions and types of threats.

2. Ministries/Institutions and local governments as supporters carry out:

- a. Coordination by providing input to the main elements in compiling and/or aligning policies and strategies to prevent and overcome threats according to their duties and functions.
- b. Coordination with the main elements in order to harmonize the preparation of program plans for deterrence and handling of threats according to their duties and functions.
- c. Providing support to the main elements in preventing and overcoming threats according to their duties and functions.
- d. Provision of data and information support to the main elements in the inventory and assessment of strategic issues that have the potential to become threats according to their duties and functions.
- e. Assessment of strategic issues that have the potential to become threats according to their duties and functions.

From this explanation, it can be understood that there are non-military threats that occur in the Sunda Strait region which can affect regional security and national safety. Apart from that, the regulations written above support a synergy strategy between ministries/Institutions that have authority in the Sunda Strait area to deal with threats in these waters. Therefore this article raises the title "Synergy between Ministries/Institutions in Dealing with Non-Military Threats in the Sunda Strait".

Based on the formulation of the problem above, the researcher compiled several research questions consisting of:

1. How is the implementation of the equality strategy in Ministry/Institutions entities to increase synergy to reduce the level of non-military threats in the Sunda Strait?
2. How to optimize coordination between Ministries/Institutions in reducing the level of non-military threats in the Sunda Strait?

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. Military Science

Military science, Art and Science of War, or also known as War Science and currently known as Defense Science cannot be separated from the influence and intervention of other sciences. The new sciences that exist today can be said to be the result of a combination or integration of various scientific disciplines which are merged into one (Supriyatno, 2014). Meanwhile, if understood word for word, then science can be interpreted as a knowledge about

a field that is arranged systematically based on certain methods that can be used to apply certain symptoms or phenomena in that field of knowledge. There are several requirements for knowledge to be regarded as science, including (Indrajit, 2020): a) there is an object of study; b) there is a method; c) are systematic; d) universally applicable; e) is objective; f) analytical in nature; and g) is verificative. The source of determination from science comes from the results of philosophical studies such as ontology, epistemology, and axiology which are then analyzed further. So it can be understood that science is knowledge that has been systematically compiled based on methods and has fulfilled the requirements. Meanwhile, defense can be interpreted as all efforts made to defend state sovereignty, territorial integrity of a country, as well as the safety of the entire nation from threats and disturbances to the integrity of the nation and state (Law No. 3 of 2002).

If the two words are merged, then it becomes the science of defense with the meaning as a branch of science that contains the application of how to use and mobilize the strength of national resources or national power owned by a nation and state in facing threats that come. The approach used is by utilizing knowledge related to defense. Defense science can also be understood as a science that studies how to manage national resources and power both during peace, war and after war in order to deal with threats from abroad and from within the country, both in the form of military and non-military threats to territorial integrity, state sovereignty, and the safety of the entire nation in realizing national security (Supriyatno, 2014). The benefits of defense science can be seen through two dimensions, namely (Supriyatno, 2014):

a. In the spatial dimension, the benefits of defense science in this dimension are further divided into two contexts, namely wars that are carried out within the country's own territory and wars that are carried out outside the country itself. In the first context, the science of defense that can be applied or used is deterrence strategy. Then in the second context, the science of

defense that can be applied is defensive active operations, by carrying out attacks to eliminate the enemy's intention to carry out an invasion or attack on the territorial area.

b. The dimension of time, defense science is used to study related to how to regulate and carry out guidance on the potential of national resources that are owned as national strength with the aim that in times of war and after war it benefits the country. This starts from peacetime by making regulations, policies, strategies, and implementation of these policies down to the operational level. Guidance on the potential of national resources in times of peace, is not only used for wartime, but is also useful for maintaining territorial sovereignty, becoming a deterrent strategy framework, building national security, and as a form of participating in maintaining peace and stability in the region and the world.

Based on the explanation above, defense science can be used to manage national resources and develop the potential of the resources they have. The synergy is aimed at managing cooperation and mobilizing its resources to deal with non-military threats that occur in Indonesian waters.

B. Strategy Theory

Strategy, defense planning and uncertainty are three things that are interrelated and to understand them cannot be separated from one another but must be understood simultaneously. Strategy is a functional requirement for every human being, because within the scope of the political community security is needed which includes efforts to adjust political goals with available means using effective methods (Gray, 2014). There are several assumptions related to strategy, including (Smith, 2011):

a. The study of ends (ends) and means (means)

Strategy can be said as an effort or effort made to link between ends, means, and ways. Michael Howard expressed his opinion related to strategy which stated that strategy is the use of all available resources to achieve the goals set (Howard, 1983)

b. The study of political actors as the central unit of analysis

Basically the strategy examines the calculations of individual actors, states, sub-state entities, as well as other social groups. Therefore, strategic theory analysis describes the options available to actors and evaluates the quality of the decisions that have been taken.

c. Understand the value system and preferences of political actors

A strategy is needed to understand the value system of the related actors, the motivation behind it, how these actors build their interests, and inform the goals to be fought for and the ways to achieve them.

d. Actors' interests will be influenced by the broad strategic environment

The strategic environment becomes an important determinant of the actors involved and the structure in which these actors operate (Harris, 2006). So it can be said that the environment determines a strategy implemented by related actors.

e. Rational behavior in achieving the goals set

By behaving rationally the decisions that are formed will also be the right decisions, in the sense that these decisions are formed after calculating the costs and benefits and have determined the most optimal way to achieve the desired end goal.

f. Accept differences of interest

In strategic theory, the actors involved are diverse and different, so it is possible that there is a conflict of interest between the actors involved. Therefore it leads to the use of war as a means to an end.

From some of the assumptions above, it can be understood that strategy is a business or effort made by linking goals, means or resources owned, and the means used to achieve these goals. This is supported by the theory of Lykke (1997) which states that strategy has three basic elements, namely ends (objectives), means (resources owned), and ways (methods used) (Lykke, 1989). So in achieving the goals that have been set, Indonesia needs to deploy its means or resources by using the most optimal way. One of them is by deploying ships owned by ministries/Institutions that have authority in territorial waters as a means of this strategy, which is then carried out by synergizing related ministries/Institutions as ways, in order to secure Indonesian waters from non-military threats that enter as ends.

C. National Defense Strategy

One Of the efforts of the government in maintaining and guaranteeing the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is by having a national defense strategy based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (1945 Constitution). The national defense of the Republic of Indonesia is all defense efforts whose implementation is universal based on awareness of the rights and obligations of citizens and belief in one's own strength (Perpres RI No: 7 of 2008). The national defense system that is universal is seen with the involvement of all citizens, territories, other national resources, and is prepared early by the government which is carried out in a total, integrated, directed and continuous manner to uphold national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and also the safety of all nation from all forms of threats that come.

Indonesia, with its vast jurisdiction and the existence of more than 17,000 islands, cannot deny the existence of various forms of threats, both military and non-military. Therefore it is necessary to have a defense force that can ward off these **various** threats. Through Article 30 of the 1945 Constitution it is explained that the defense and security of the state is carried out through the universal people's defense and security system (Sishankamrata) by placing the Indonesian National Armed Forces and the Indonesian National Police as the main forces, while the people are placed as supporting forces. Sishankamrata becomes the doctrine and strategy for national defense by using all the strengths and capabilities of the military and non-military components in a comprehensive and integrated manner, as well as being populist, regional and universal. Comprehensively, all departments as well as non-departmental government Institutions, as well as the legal participation of all elements of the nation are involved in Sishankamrata.

In Law no. 3 of 2002 Article 6 explains that national defense is carried out through fostering the capacity, deterrence of the state and nation, and tackling every threat that comes. Furthermore, in Article 25 paragraph (2) it is stated that the development of national defense is aimed at building, maintaining, developing and using the Indonesian National **Armed** Forces and other defense components. As explained in the previous paragraph, Indonesia must be prepared to face various forms of threats, in Law no. 3 of 2002 Article 7 paragraph (3) stated that:

"The national defense system in dealing with non-military threats places government Institutions outside the field of defense as the main element, in accordance with the form and nature of the threats faced by supporting other elements of national strength"

The national defense strategy is a derivative of the defense doctrine, therefore the Republic of Indonesia's national defense strategy is the Universal People's Defense and Security System (Sishankamrata) which is populist, territorial and universal with all departments and also non-departmental government institutions, as well as legal participation all elements of the nation. In the Sishankamrata, the Indonesian National Armed Forces and the Indonesian National Police are placed as the main force, while the people are the supporting force. However, in relation to dealing with non-military threats, the main element is government Institutions outside the defense sector by adjusting them based on the shape and nature of the threats they face. However, due to the large number of ministries/Institutions related to Indonesian territorial waters, there is a need for synergy between ministries/Institutions involved in the maritime area to deal with non-military threats that occur. As stated by the head of Bakamla at the Indonesian Maritime Security Coordination meeting which explained that in order to synergize the relevant ministries/Institutions, it is necessary to have a unified mindset, attitude pattern and action pattern in order to realize fast and appropriate handling in the face of non-military threats that occur.

D. Maritime Strategy

Strategy has a meaning as a plan of action designed to achieve the stated goals as stated by Rear Admiral JC Wylie USN. Referring to the strategy model put forward by Arthur F. Lykke in 1997, strategy has three main elements, namely: a) Ends, the results of all considerations of interests and also various factors in the strategic environment that can influence the realization of national goals; b) Means, this element includes the means and resources that can be used in order to achieve the strategy that has been set, as well as being a limit to the types and tactics of capital support available to realize the strategy, and c) Ways, this third element is how to achieve the goal that has been determined by utilizing various existing instruments to the fullest. In other words, this third element is a liaison between existing resources and the goals that have been set, or it can be said as "how" the goals that have been set are achieved (Lykke, 1989).

Meanwhile the definition of maritime strategy according to Corbett is the principles governing war with the sea as an important factor (Speller, 2019). The important part of the maritime strategy is the sea command and control of the sea, but in practice this cannot be done absolutely. Sea command and control of the sea can only refer to temporary sea control and direction of sea communication lines (Corbett, 1911). Furthermore, Corbett also explained a concept of joint operations between the army and navy as the meaning of an effective maritime strategy. The maritime strategy consists of uniting and coordinating the factors of national power, including diplomatic, military and economic elements in achieving the protection of national interests (McCaffrie, 2007).

Furthermore, with regard to maritime strategy, Ken Booth also expressed his opinion about the trinity of the roles of the navy, namely the military role, the police role, and the role of diplomacy (Booth, 1977). In theory it is explained that the navy also carries out operations other than war, this is because the navy has a universal role which includes military, diplomatic and police roles. Briefly these roles are as follows (Booth, 1977):

a. The Role of Diplomacy (Diplomacy Supporting), the navy also has a diplomatic role in which in this case its strength is needed as a means of diplomacy in supporting foreign policy policies implemented by the Indonesian government, and is designed to influence the leadership of a country or several countries either in peacetime or in a bad situation.

b. Police Role (Constabulary), in the second role, the navy plays a role in enforcing the law at sea, protecting national marine resources and wealth, maintaining order at sea from all forms of criminal acts at sea, and also supporting the national development of the Indonesian nation related to contribute to the country's stability and national development.

c. Military Role (Military/Defence), this role is carried out by the navy in order to uphold the sovereignty of a country at sea by means of state defense and deterrence in the territorial waters of Indonesia's national jurisdiction, preparing forces to prepare for war, warding off military threats from the state others who come through the territorial waters, maintain the stability of the maritime area, protect and also guard the sea borders with neighboring countries.

From the theory presented by Ken Booth, synergy between Ministries/Institutions in reducing the level of non-military threats is one of the police or constabulary roles carried out by the Indonesian Navy and other maritime Ministries/Institutions with the aim of enforcing the law at sea, protecting marine resources and wealth. at sea, maintaining order at sea from all forms of criminal acts at sea, and also supporting the national development of the Indonesian nation which is related to contributing to the stability of the country and national development. As for the linkage of other opinions with the synergy between ministries/Institutions, namely to maximize the existing sea command and control of the sea, with the aim of protecting a country's maritime lanes and boundaries as well as part of a national security policy.

E. Threats Theory

Referring to the 2008 Indonesian Defense White Paper, Indonesia's perception of threats is every business and activity carried out both from outside and within the country, which is considered to threaten and endanger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, as well as the safety of the nation (Ministry of Defense, 2008). The book also explains the nature of threats which are divided into two, namely military threats and non-military threats. Military threats can be interpreted as threats carried out using armed and organized force so that they are considered to endanger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, as well as the safety of the entire Indonesian nation (Ministry of Defense, 2008). Forms of military threats include aggression, armed rebellion, sabotage, espionage, and acts of armed terror.

While non-military threats are threats made using non-military factors that are considered capable of endangering the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, as well as the safety of the entire nation (Ministry of Defense, 2008). Non-military threats are divided into several dimensions including ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, technological and information dimensions, as well as public safety. However, there were changes written in the 2015 Indonesian Defense White Paper, in which the nature of threats changed and was divided into three types of threats, namely military threats, non-military threats, and hybrid threats (Ministry of Defense, 2015). These changes can occur due to the development of a strategic environment that is dynamic and has an impact on the spectrum of threats.

Threats are also the determining factor or the main factor that underlies the formulation of a country's defense system. The way to deal with the three types of threats varies, in dealing with military threats the TNI is placed as the Main Component (Komput) which is also supported by the Reserve Component (Komcad) and the Supporting Component (Komduk). Meanwhile,

to deal with non-military threats, a non-military approach is needed, which means placing departments and non-departmental institutions as the main element, while the TNI is placed as a supporter. Then, in dealing with hybrid threats, namely by implementing a military defense pattern that is supported by non-military defense forces formed as Supporting Components (Ministry of Defense, 2015). The threat that is rife in the waters of the Sunda Strait is a non-military threat, so from the explanation above the ministries/Institutions related to the maritime area are placed as the main component. However, the large number of related ministries/institutions requires synergy to be able to provide a fast response in dealing with these non-military threats according to the explanation in the research background.

F. Synergy Theory

Synergy can be interpreted as a form of beneficial cooperation through the collaboration of each party without any defeat. Synergy also means filling each other out and complementing differences in order to achieve greater results than if done individually (Covey, 2013). Another opinion reveals that synergy is a process of interaction between two or more agents by producing a greater influence than the influence produced by individuals (Deardorff & William, 2006). Synergy also results in cooperation from a variety of different paradigms that lead to greater and more effective results, besides that the goals of this collaboration have also been set together. The concept of synergy is divided into four (Covey, 2013), including:

- a. Results oriented and positive
- b. Multiple perspectives replace and/or complement existing paradigms
- c. Cooperate with the same goals and the existence of an agreement
- d. Very effectively cultivated and become a process

The way that can be done to create synergies is to build creative cooperation between the agents involved while respecting existing differences, building strengths, and also compensating for weaknesses (Purnama, 2019).

From the opinions that have been conveyed, it can be understood the meaning of synergy, namely a collaboration or collaboration carried out by two or more agents by involving interactions between the two and combining different paradigms and complementing these differences in order to produce greater influence to achieve goals. already set together. Synergy is also carried out by respecting differences of opinion and not prioritizing personal interests but thinking about being able to win and ensuring that no party is harmed. This theory becomes applied theory in this research, because the object of this research is the synergy between ministries/Institutions in dealing with non-military threats in the Sunda Strait.

III. METHODOLOGY

This study uses qualitative research methods in order to explore and understand the meaning of social or humanitarian problems. In a qualitative method, only researchers are able to understand how the research model will be made, and will temporarily estimate the results that will be obtained in the field (Bungin, 2020). The purpose of this research method is to gain an understanding of reality through an inductive thinking process. Bogdan and Taylor argued that the qualitative method is a research procedure that produces descriptive data in the form of written or spoken words from several people and observable behavior (Moloeng, 2010). Another opinion suggests that qualitative research has meaning as a type of research aimed at investigating, finding, describing, and explaining the quality of social influence that cannot be explained, measured, or described using a quantitative approach to numerical calculations (Saryono, 2010). Furthermore, the opinion of Sugiyono (2013) regarding qualitative research is a research method based on the philosophy of postpositivism, in which this research is widely used to carry out research on natural object conditions. Sugiyono (2013) also revealed that the task of the researcher is as the main tool.

Referring to one of the characteristics of qualitative research put forward by Creswell (2016), namely the natural setting, qualitative researchers tend to collect data from informants or research subjects in their natural settings. In the sense that the event or phenomenon that the researcher wants to capture remains in the natural setting of the research subject. Therefore in the application of qualitative research in this study, researchers used in-depth interview methods in order to capture the individual meanings of the research subjects in the natural settings around them. Sampling of data sources was done purposively and snowball, with triangulation collection techniques, inductive or qualitative data analysis.


Furthermore, the approach used in this study is the phenomenological approach. Phenomenology is an interpretive study that has an as-is nature related to human experience with the aim of being able to understand and describe human situations, events, and also experiences as something that appears and is present everyday (von Eckartsberg, 1998). This approach can be used as a way of updating to view the relationship between humans and the environment, as well as studying the interrelationships between the two.

In this study, the use of qualitative research methods and phenomenology as an approach to this research is intended to understand the need to optimize synergies between maritime ministries/Institutions to deal with non-military threats that come through Indonesian waters.

The subjects of this study included the Commander of the Banten Navy Base, Head of Sub Directorate Sun Jakbanghanneg Ditjakstrahan Ministry of Defense, Head of Operations Strategy Directorate of Fleet Monitoring and Operations Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. Head of Public Relations and Protocol of the Indonesian Bakamla, and Lecturer at the Indonesian Defense University. The object of this research is the synergy between ministries/Institutions in dealing with non-military threats.

IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

To obtain the necessary data, the researcher conducted interviews with informants or research subjects either in person or offline or online via zoom. From the results of the interviews, the data were processed according to data analysis techniques, namely data collection, data condensation, data display, and finally drawing conclusions. After the data was collected, it was found that the data was divided into two broad categories namely the implementation of a common strategy in Ministry/Institutions entities to increase synergy to reduce the level of non-military threats in the Sunda Strait, as well as optimization of coordination between Ministries/Institutions in reducing the level of non-military threats in the Sunda Strait. Then, if the data is analyzed, it is found that several factors influence the two categories. The results of the analysis can be seen in the image below.



Processed by Researchers, 2023

Factors influencing the implementation of the equality strategy in Ministry/Institutions entities to increase synergy to reduce the level of non-military threats in the Sunda Strait, include coordination between Ministries/Institutions, intelligence data collection, and patterns of operations. The analysis of these three factors can be explained as follows:

a. Coordination between ministries/Institutions

In connection with the first factor found, namely coordination between Ministries/Institutions, this is necessary to be able to share data containing indications of threats with the aim of being able to complement each other. Coordination is also needed to build maritime situational awareness which is realized by joint patrols between ministries/Institutions. Coordination or synergy is also in accordance with the doctrine of Defense of the Universal People and Law no. 3 of 2002, which explains that the main elements in dealing with non-military threats are ministries/Institutions outside the defense sector (KP, LB, BK, and KH interviews, 2022).

From the results above, it can be understood that coordination between ministries/Institutions is needed to deal with non-military threats that occur at sea. As for coordination or synergy, it is intended to be able to complement each other's data which

helps the Ministries/Institutions to take necessary actions. In addition to exchanging data, coordination is also needed in order to carry out joint patrols in Indonesian territorial waters. This is because in dealing with non-military threats, Ministries/Institutions outside the defense sector are positioned as the main element in accordance with the law mentioned above.

b. Intelligence Data Collection

The second factor found in this research is intelligence data collection obtained from posts or small posts spread across the Banten region. In addition, the surrounding community also has a role in collecting intelligence data by providing reports when indications of threats are detected. Apart from these two ways of collecting data, the role of other Ministries/Institutions is also needed to share data regarding threat indications and points of vulnerability at sea (KP, LB, and BK interview, 2022).

In this regard, intelligence data collection can be carried out by receiving data from each scattered post, making the local community as agents who will later provide reports if there are indications of threats at sea, and also by sharing data across ranks, Institutions, and Ministries/Institutions to be able to complement each other's data.

c. Operation Pattern

The next factor is the pattern of operations held by each Ministry/Institution. The pattern of operations carried out is by conducting remote monitoring using satellites owned to obtain data, which later the data will be analyzed and validated. This valid data is needed to carry out intercept operations, but other operations that do not require data, namely patrols. Patrols can also be carried out jointly by involving other Ministries/Institutions that have authority and assets that can be moved at sea, however Ministries/Institutions that have authority but do not have assets that can be moved can also participate in joint patrols. The other operating pattern is fleet in being with the aim of building maritime situational awareness (KP, LB and BK interviews, 2022).

From the paragraph above, it can be understood that the pattern of operations carried out in suppressing the level of non-military threats at sea requires involvement between Ministries/Institutions in order to realize the stated goals, namely by successfully suppressing the level of non-military threats in the Sunda Strait. As for the second category, the results of the analysis of the data can be explained as follows:

a. Policy

This research found two factors in optimizing coordination between Ministries/Institutions in suppressing the level of non-military threats in the Sunda Strait, namely policies and constraints. The first factor in optimizing coordination between Ministries/Institutions in reducing the level of non-military threats is the policy on coordination between Ministries/Institutions to participate in carrying out actions in order to build non-military defense forces in accordance with their respective duties and fields. This coordination or synergy is in accordance with the Universal People's Defense doctrine, which in essence is to synergize military and non-military forces, which is then supported by Law no. 3 of 2002 which states that Ministries/Institutions outside the field of defense are the main element in dealing with non-military threats. Coordination or synergy has been described in the General Policy on National Defense, namely Presidential Decree No. 8 of 2021 and also written in PP No. 13 of 2022 by making Bakamla the chief coordinator (KH and BK interview, 2022).

From the paragraph above, in order to optimize coordination between Ministries/Institutions in reducing the level of non-military threats, policies are needed that regulate coordination or synergy between Ministries/Institutions. The policies mentioned above also regulate the need for forums between ministries/Institutions and the required integration system so that optimal synergy is formed.

b. Constraint

The second factor is the obstacles that arise and can hinder the optimization of coordination between Ministries/Institutions, such as the absence of cross-Institutions data connection. In addition, there is still a different legal umbrella for each Ministry/Institution which then causes overlapping legislation. Another obstacle is that there is still an ego-sectoral nature in each institution. In this regard, the absence of strong policies in regulating coordination or synergy is an obstacle. The budget is also one of the obstacles in optimizing national defense and also overlapping presence at one point in the territorial waters. The last obstacle is the lack of fleet numbers which is still related to the previous obstacle, namely the budget, and the low monitoring coverage area (KP, LB, BK, KH, and DU 2022 interviews).

In the second factor, it can be understood that the obstacle that needs to be faced in optimizing is the need to form a policy that has the power to be able to regulate and bind Ministries/Institutions to carry out coordination and appoint a head of coordinator who is authorized to regulate the technical aspects of this coordination. If coordination has been carried out, there will be an adequate fleet and manpower to achieve optimal national defense, as well as the formation of good synergies between Ministries/Institutions in reducing the level of non-military threats in Indonesian waters.

In conducting the discussion, the factors that can influence the first category are related to the theory used in this study. Meanwhile, if these three factors are connected with the strategy theory put forward by Lykke (1997), then they can be translated into ends or objectives set, namely success in suppressing the level of non-military threats in the Sunda Strait, by coordinating between Institutions, collecting intelligence data. and apply appropriate operating patterns as the embodiment of the way, and for means, namely the entire fleet or assets owned by each Ministry/Institution.

In connection with the first factor found, namely coordination between Ministries/Institutions, this is necessary to be able to share data containing indications of threats with the aim of being able to complement each other. The coordination factor has been previously mentioned in a previous study put forward by Ansori, et al. (2017) and Sunardi et al. (2020) by stating that coordination is one of the factors in building synergy. In addition, more intensive cooperation and formal interaction through effective cooperation procedures need to be increased (Kusuma et al., 2019). In this study, the results of interviews with informants show that coordination is needed to build maritime situational awareness which is manifested by joint patrols between ministries/Institutions. Coordination or synergy is also in accordance with the doctrine of Defense of the Universal People and Law no. 3 of 2002, which explains that the main element in dealing with non-military threats is Ministries/Institutions outside the defense sector. In other words, coordination between ministries/Institutions is needed to deal with non-military threats that occur at sea. Coordination or synergy is intended to complement each other's data which helps the Ministries/Institutions to take necessary actions. In addition to exchanging data, coordination is also needed in order to carry out joint patrols in Indonesian territorial waters. This is because in dealing with non-military threats, Ministries/Institutions outside the defense sector are positioned as the main element in accordance with the law mentioned above.

The second factor found in this research is intelligence data collection obtained from posts or small posts spread across the Banten region. In addition, the surrounding community also has a role in collecting intelligence data by providing reports when indications of threats are detected. The second factor that was found after conducting an analysis of the results of interviews with informants was in accordance with the theory listed in the theoretical basis, namely defense science. Referring to defense science, the mobilization of the surrounding community in collecting intelligence data is a form of utilizing and deploying the strength of national resources or national power owned by a nation and state in dealing with incoming threats. Apart from these two ways of collecting data, the role of other Ministries/Institutions is also needed to share data related to threat indications and points of vulnerability in the sea.

The next factor is the pattern of operations held by each Ministry/Institution. The pattern of operations carried out is by conducting remote monitoring using satellites owned to obtain data, which later the data will be analyzed and validated. This valid data is needed to carry out intercept operations but other operations that do not require data, namely patrols. Patrols can also be carried out jointly by involving other Ministries/Institutions that have authority and assets that can be moved at sea, however Ministries/Institutions that have authority but do not have assets that can be moved can also participate in joint patrols. The other operating pattern is fleet in being with the aim of building maritime situational awareness.

The three factors above are connected with the theory of synergy which is used as the theoretical basis in this research, so a relationship will be found where the way that can be used to realize synergy is to build creative cooperation between the agents involved while respecting existing differences, building strengths, and also compensate for weaknesses. Furthermore, the maritime strategy put forward by Ken Booth (1997) is related to the trinity of naval roles, one of which is the police or constabulary role. The existence of both intercept and patrol operations is a form of police role, which has the aim of enforcing the law at sea, protecting national marine resources and wealth, maintaining order at sea from all forms of criminal acts at sea, and also supporting the national development of the Indonesian nation which is relating to contributing to the stability of the country and national development.

Coordination between Ministries/Institutions that provides benefits to facilitate the collection of intelligence data to carry out both patrol and intercept operations, in line with the theories that have been mentioned, the national defense strategy

implemented in Indonesia has a universal nature which requires the involvement of all citizens, regions, other national resources which is realized by coordinating between Ministries/Institutions that are prepared early by the government by organizing in a total, integrated, directed and continuous manner to uphold state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and also the safety of the whole nation from all forms of threats that come.

In addition, this research found two factors in optimizing coordination between Ministries/Institutions in suppressing the level of non-military threats in the Sunda Strait, namely policies and constraints. The first factor in optimizing coordination between Ministries/Institutions in reducing the level of non-military threats is the policy regarding coordination between Ministries/Institutions to take part in carrying out actions in order to build non-military defense forces according to their duties and functions, as well as in their respective fields. This coordination or synergy is in accordance with the Universal People's Defense doctrine, which in essence is to synergize military and non-military forces, which is then supported by Law no. 3 of 2002 which states that Ministries/Institutions outside the field of defense are the main element in dealing with non-military threats. Coordination or synergy has been described in the General Policy on National Defense, namely Presidential Decree No. 8 of 2021 and also written in PP No. 13 of 2022 by making Bakamla the chief coordinator. This factor is also a continuation of previous research conducted by Elvis, et al. (2020) which states that each Institutions still uses internal regulations which cause overlapping policies, limited infrastructure, non-formal communication, and upholding the regulations each applies. So in this study, the results of interviews with informants found that policies have an influence in optimizing coordination between Ministries/Institutions in reducing the level of non-military threats. The policies needed are policies that regulate coordination or synergy between Ministries/Institutions. The policies mentioned above also stipulate the need for forums between ministries/Institutions and the required integration system so that good synergies are formed to optimize coordination.

The second factor is the obstacles that arise and can hinder the optimization of coordination between Ministries/Institutions, such as the absence of cross-Institutions data connection. In addition, there is still a different legal umbrella for each Ministry/Institution which then causes overlapping legislation. Another obstacle is that there is still an ego-sectoral nature in each institution. In this regard, the absence of strong policies in regulating coordination or synergy is an obstacle. The budget is also one of the obstacles in optimizing coordination and also overlapping attendance at one point in the territorial waters. The last obstacle is the lack of fleet numbers which is still related to the previous constraint, namely the budget, as well as the low monitoring coverage area. It can be understood that this second factor, namely constraints, has a relationship with the main factor. The obstacle that needs to be faced in optimizing is the need to form a policy that has the power to be able to regulate and bind Ministries/Institutions to carry out coordination and appoint a head of coordinator who is authorized to regulate the technical aspects of this coordination. If coordination has been carried out, the existence of an adequate fleet and man power can optimize efforts to reduce the level of non-military threats, as well as the formation of good synergy between ministries/Institutions.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the results of the research and also the written discussion which is also adapted to the research questions that have been set out in Chapter I, it can be concluded several things as follows:

1. The implementation of a defense strategy in Ministry/Institutions entities to increase synergy to reduce the level of non-military threats in the Sunda Strait has three influencing factors, namely coordination between Ministries/Institutions, intelligence data collection, and patterns of operations. These three factors are related to one another. In order to achieve success in suppressing the level of non-military threats in the Sunda Strait, it is necessary to have coordination between ministries/Institutions as a way to complement intelligence data by sharing data across ranks, Institutions and ministries/Institutions. The collected data is needed to carry out operations, both intercept operations, independent patrols or joint patrols

2. Optimization of coordination between Ministries/Institutions in reducing the level of non-military threats in the Sunda Strait by the two factors found, namely policies and constraints. Policy factors and constraints are related to optimizing coordination between Ministries/Institutions in reducing the level of non-military threats in the Sunda Strait, this is due to the constraints on forming good synergy or coordination, namely the absence of a strong policy that can bind all Ministries/Institutions to synergize. Meanwhile, synergy and coordination are needed to optimize efforts to reduce the level of non-military threats.

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